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GUNSMOKE AND LEGAL MIRRORS:
WOMEN SURVIVING INTIMATE BATTERY AND
DEADLY LEGAL DOCTRINES
Judith E. Koons*
Gunsmoke trail.
Oh tell me of days gone by.
- Theme from Gunsmoke⊥
[Y]ou wanna control.
I mean, that’s where the hitting comes from.
To put fear in ‘em.
- Participant in Batterers’ Intervention Program±
We do not ask of the man in the barroom brawl
that he leave the bar before the occurrence of an anticipated fight,
but we do ask the battered woman threatened with a gun why she
did not leave the relationship.
- V. F. Nourse§
*

Associate Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law, Orlando,
Florida. B.A., J.D. University of Florida, M.T.S. Harvard Divinity School.
Copyright, Judith E. Koons, 2006. I am indebted to the faculty and staff of the
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⊥
REX KOURY & GLENN J. SPENCER, THEME FROM GUNSMOKE (Herman
Music, Inc. 1955).
±
Julia T. Wood, Monsters and Victims: Male Felons’ Accounts of Intimate
Partner Violence, 21 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 564 (2004) (reporting
accounts of intimate partner violence and how the accounts draw upon
understandings of codes of manhood).
§
V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1238
(2001) [hereinafter Nourse, Subjectivity].
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INTRODUCTION
In a prototypical plot of the1960s television series
“Gunsmoke,” Miss Kitty is defending herself against a homicidal
bandit while Marshall Dillon deputizes the men of the town.1 In
2005— and in true Gunsmoke-ethos—Florida fortified the castle
doctrine’s privilege in which people are permitted to use deadly
force in their homes without retreating.2
Supported by an unprecedented system of presumptions
justifying the use of deadly force, as well as immunities from
criminal and civil actions where force is used as authorized, the act
abrogated the common law duty to retreat outside of a dwelling.3
1

E.g., Gunsmoke: Help Me Kitty (featuring Miss Kitty’s shooting a
stagecoach bandit in self-defense) (CBS television broadcast Nov. 7, 1964)
(episode guide), at http://www.tv.com/gunsmoke/show/236/episode_guide.
html&season’10 (last visited July 20, 2005); Gunsmoke: Uncle Finney
(depicting an attempted robbery that is thwarted by Festus, acting as Matt
Dillon’s deputy) (CBS television broadcast Oct. 14, 1968). Set in Dodge City,
Kansas, in 1873, Gunsmoke aired from 1955-1975 and starred James Arness as
Marshall Matt Dillon, Amanda Blake as Kitty Russell, Milburn Stone as Doc
Adams, Dennis Weaver as Chester Goode, and Ken Curtis as Festus Haggen.
The (New) Network and Cable TV Guide, Gunsmoke, at
http://www.geocities.com/TelevisionCity/9348/gunsmoke.htm?200528
(last
visited Jul. 27, 2005).
2
See S.B. 436, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2005); see also Rick Neale,
“Deadly Force” Law Draws Mixed Views, FL. TODAY, Apr. 28, 2005, available
at http:www.floridatoday.com (last visited May 30, 2005) (referring to statement
of Peter Gunn, spokesperson of the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence,
that Florida’s act operates to deputize its entire citizenry). For a discussion of the
history of the castle doctrine, see infra Part II. For a review of Florida’s
codification of the castle doctrine, see infra Part III.
3
Florida joined a number of states that have abrogated the duty to retreat
outside of a dwelling, but was the first state to adopt a system of statutory
presumptions justifying the use of deadly force and immunities from civil action
and criminal prosecution where force is used as authorized. See S.B. 436, 107th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (creating Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.013(1), which establishes a
presumption of fear of death or great bodily harm to justify deadly force against
a person who is unlawfully and forcefully entering a dwelling or occupied
vehicle, and creating Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.032, which provides immunity from
criminal prosecution and civil action where force is used as outlined in the
statute); see also Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, The Castle
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At the same time, the statutory re-casting of the castle doctrine left
intact ambiguities in the law that effectively place a duty to retreat
on women who live with battering men.4 The re-working of the
castle doctrine gives occasion for the broader project of this
article—to study gender contradictions in the construction of legal
doctrines.5
Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 653, 663 (2003) (advising that
“[m]ost jurisdictions do not impose the duty to retreat on one who is unlawfully
attacked, whether in public or private space.”). For an overview of the duty to
retreat in the United States, see Part II, infra. For a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction
analysis of the retreat doctrine, see infra note 41. For a discussion of the duty to
retreat in Florida, see infra Part III.
4
That the Florida legislature was not considering the circumstances of
women who live with battering men is apparent by the bill’s granting a
presumption of fear of death or great bodily harm in situations of unlawful entry
into a residence (or classic stranger violence that is commonly experienced by
men), not where a person is being battered by a co-resident who is lawfully on
the premises (or classic intimate partner violence that is commonly experienced
by women). See, e.g., Ronet Bachman & Linda Saltzman, U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Violence Against Women: Estimates from the Redesigned Survey 3 (Aug.
1995),
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/femvied.pdf
[hereinafter Bachman & Saltzman] (reporting findings of the National Crime
Victimization Survey of the Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of
Justice, including results that “[m]en were about twice as likely as women to
experience acts of violence by strangers” while “women were about 6 times
more likely to experience violence committed by an intimate.”). Furthermore,
the act asserts a standard of imminence (i.e., deadly force is justified where
necessary to prevent imminent death, great bodily harm, or to prevent the
imminent commission of forcible felony). S.B. 436, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl.
2005) (amending ‘ 776.012). Imminence has been critiqued as a porous standard
that has operated to the disadvantage of women who kill battering men. Nourse,
Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1237, 1282. For further discussion of the act, see
Part III, infra. For further discussion of the standard of imminence, see Parts
V.A. & C., infra.
5
This article highlights the Florida act to examine the construction of the
law (and gender inequity in the law). I have previously situated my work within
a feminist history of ideas and construction of thought. See Judith E. Koons,
Motherhood, Marriage, and Morality, The Pro-Marriage Moral Discourse of
American Welfare Policy, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Koons,
Motherhood] (utilizing a critical genealogical approach to inspect the social,
theological, and historical tracks of four sets of values (good mother / bad
mother, deserving / undeserving, independent / dependent, and legitimate /
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A key lobbyist for the National Rifle Association (the “NRA”)
characterized the emboldened castle doctrine as the “first step of a
multi-state strategy” to introduce similar legislation across the
country.6 Citing plans to begin “dropping bills” in capitals, the
NRA’s Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre advised, “We
will go everywhere, red states and blue states, including New
York. It is both a liberty and a crime issue with a big political
tailwind. Politicians are putting their career in jeopardy if they
oppose this type of bill.”7
illegitimate) in the moral discourse of contemporary welfare policy); FRIEDRICH
NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS: A POLEMIC 16 (Walter Kaufmann
& R. J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books ed. 1989) (1887) (developing a
critical genealogical approach to question “where our good and evil really
originated.”) (emphasis in original); PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY
OF PRACTICE 168-69 (1977) (proposing that outside of the universe of orthodoxy
and heterodoxy (or “right” opinion and “left” or “wrong” opinion), is the doxa,
which is the “universe of the undiscussed” (the class of that which is beyond
question and taken for granted) and that the truth of doxa is only revealed when
critique “brings the undiscussed into discussion.”); see also Nancy Fraser &
Linda Gordon, The Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S.
Welfare State, 19 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 309, 310 (1994)
(reconstructing the genealogy of dependency) reprinted in BARBARA LANSLETT,
ET AL., RETHINKING THE POLITICAL 36 (1995); CORNEL WEST, PROPHESY
DELIVERANCE: AN AFRO-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY CHRISTIANITY 48 (1st ed.
1982) (seeking, in a non-reductive historiography, the “‘moment of arising’ of
the idea of white supremacy within the modern discourse in the West”); Nourse,
Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1293 (adopting an intellectual method of
constitutive feminist inquiry to ask how the law “constitutes us and our
relationship to the political order.”). Cf. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN 92
(Brooks Atkinson ed., 1992) (1854) (while “burrowing” his cabin on the hillside
of Walden and suggesting that “our lives must be stripped,” Thoreau advised us
to “work and wedge our feet down through the mud and slush of opinion, and
prejudice, and tradition, and delusion, and appearances, that alluvium which
covers the globe . . . .”).
6
Manuel Roig-Franzia, Fla. Gun Law to Expand Leeway for Self-Defense,
WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2005, at A01; see also Jacqui Goddard, Florida Boosts
Gun Rights, Igniting a Debate, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 10, 2005, at
2 (noting that the NRA chose Florida to launch this gun initiative and hopes to
take the campaign nationwide).
7
Andrew Metz, NRA Axiom Now Fla. Law, NEWSDAY, Apr. 28, 2005, at
A27 (also reporting that the NRA plans to target “at least 29 states, including
New York, that have laws with specific retreat requirements.”).
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Although proponents contended that “[d]isorder and chaos are
always held in check by the law-abiding citizen,”8 critics asserted
that the act is a dangerous return to the Wild West.9 Some
observers described the political impulse behind the act as “a
perverse exploitation of a politician’s fear of appearing soft on
crime,”10 while others proposed that the “emotionally manipulative
measure” merely codifies pre-existing rights to self-defense.11
While echoing many of the foregoing general criticisms, this
article sets up a hermeneutic12 of inclusive conversation13 to
8

Roig-Franzia, supra note 6, at 2 (quoting House sponsor Dennis Baxley
(R. Ocala)).
9
Marc Caputo & Gary Fineout, Deadly Force Bill Passes House, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 1, 2005, at A1; see also Goddard, supra note 6, at 2 (quoting
opponent who fears the measure will promote vigilantism and “turn Florida into
the O.K. Corral.”).
10
Metz, supra note 7, at 2 (quoting Richard Aborn, president of New
Yorkers Against Gun Violence). The Florida House of Representatives voted 94
to 20 in favor of the bill; the Florida Senate passed it on a vote of 39 to 0. Abby
Goodnough, Florida Expands Right to Use Deadly Force in Self-Defense, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, at A18.
11
Daniel Ruth, You Talkin’ To Me?, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Apr. 22, 2005, at 2.
At first glance, it may seem that the Florida legislature merely shored up preexisting law. However, the legislature endowed the castle doctrine with a novel
system of presumptions and immunities, creating a “castle doctrine on steroids.”
For further discussion of the presumptions and immunities adopted by the act,
see infra Part II.
12
In a narrow sense, hermeneutics refers to the interpretation of written
texts. E.g., DONALD K. MCKIM, WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF THEOLOGICAL
TERMS 127 (1996) [hereinafter WESTMINSTER] (defining hermeneutics in terms
of searching for meanings of writings, particularly biblical texts). Broadly
speaking, however, hermeneutics is understood as the “art of understanding.”
Bernard C. Lategan, Hermeneutics, in ANCHOR BIBLE DICTIONARY 149 (David
Noel Freedman ed., 1992) (also observing that hermeneutics includes the name
of “Hermes,” the messenger of the gods and the inventor of speech and writing).
For an elaboration on the theoretical basis for the hermeneutical enterprise, see
infra Part IV.
13
Social ethicist Ralph B. Potter, Professor Emeritus of Harvard Divinity
School, developed the framework of inclusive conversation to encourage full
moral deliberation in public and interpersonal discourse. See Ralph B. Potter,
Reunion Day 4 (1980) (unpublished manuscript, McCormick Theological
Seminary, Chicago, IL., on file with the author) [hereinafter Potter 1980]; see
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examine gender distortions in the law’s construction of the retreat
and castle doctrines. For, while women who have been battered in
their homes14 and who must then fight for their lives in a criminal
justice system that is structured with inhospitable legal doctrines,
people (mostly men) have been given license to carry concealed
weapons15 and expanded legal protections for the use of deadly
force in the public domain.16 Given the human wreckage created
by domestic violence,17 the discriminatory effects of the gender
also Judith E. Koons, Making Peace With Difference: A Hermeneutic of
Inclusive Conversation, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Koons,
Making Peace] (adapting Potter’s approach to construct an interdisciplinary
critical and constructive hermeneutic for evaluating the “problem” and the
“potentiality” of difference). Also known as “Potter’s Boxes,” the methodology
seeks to ensure that the critical dimensions of our existence (the natural order,
self, society, and ultimate reality) are included in moral deliberation. Id. at 20.
This article adapts Potter’s Boxes to examine the experiences of women who
live with battering men and key doctrines that structure the criminal justice
system for women who kill battering men. For a discussion of Potter’s Boxes,
see infra Part IV.
14
Approximately three-fourths of women who experience intimate violent
report that the offense occurred at or near their homes. Lawrence A. Greenfeld
et al., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Violence by Intimates: Analysis of Data on Crimes
by Current or Former Spouses, Boyfriends, and Girlfriends 11 (1998), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/vi.pdf (also stating that women are five
to eight times more likely than men to be victimized by an intimate partner)
[hereinafter Greenfeld]; see also Bachman & Saltzman, supra note 4, at 1
(advising that about seventy-five percent of “lone-offender” violence against
women was carried out by an offender known to the victim and that twenty-nine
percent of violence against women was perpetrated by an intimate partner).
15
See Fla. Stat. ‘ 790.06 (2005). In the wake of Florida’s adoption of a
mandatory conceal-carry licensing act in 1987, one million licenses were issued.
Lee Nessel Daszuta, Sticking to their Guns, FLA. TODAY, Apr. 25, 2005.
16
Most men are assaulted and killed outside their homes by strangers, but
most women are assaulted and killed within their homes by male partners.
Marina Angel, Criminal Law and Women: Giving the Abused Woman Who Kills
a Jury of Her Peers Who Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229, 320
(1996). Of the 341,974 current conceal-carry gun licenses held in the state,
approximately eighty-five percent are issued to men. See Daszuta, supra note
15, at 4 (also quoting the statements of Marion Hammer, NRA spokesperson,
that the NRA “fought for seven years” to pass the law and, after it was vetoed by
Governor Graham in 1986, “we elected a new governor and passed it again.”).
17
Considerable attention has been paid by feminist scholars to the use of
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the terms “domestic violence,” “spouse abuse,” and “battered women.” E.g.,
Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological Legal
Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1295, 1299 n. 9 (1993) (noting dissatisfaction with the terminology, as
“domestic violence” is inaccurately gender-neutral and trivializes the criminality
of the behavior, while “battered woman” connotes weakness, passivity, or
abnormality); see also Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to
Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1191, 1204 (1993) (advising that the terms “spouse abuse,” “domestic
violence”, “marital assault,” “woman abuse,” and “battering” are, in the
scientific field, used interchangeably to refer to the broad range of behaviors
considered to be violent and abusive within an intimate relationship).
The phrases “domestic violence” and “spouse abuse” have been challenged as
connoting an inappropriate gender symmetry. E.g., Margaret Thornton,
Feminism and the Contradictions of Law Reform, 19 INT’L J. SOC. L. 453, 460
(1991) (proposing that “spouse abuse” suggests a non-existent neutrality and
that “domestic violence” also disguises which sex is responsible for the
preponderance of the battering). A recent Department of Justice study shows
that about three-fourths of the victims of family violence were women and that
three-fourths of the persons who perpetrated family violence were male.
Matthew R. Durose et al., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Family Violence Statistics (June
2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs02.pdf (also stating
that women were eighty-four percent of spouse abuse victims and eighty-six
percent of victims of intimate abuse).
Furthermore, the term “battered women” has been critiqued as “reductive,” by
implying that the total experience of a woman is limited to being battered.
ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 61
(2000) [hereinafter SCHNEIDER, LAWMAKING]. Cf. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr.,
“Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special
Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL.
L. REV. 409, 534 (1997) (reporting that terminology has been a “sensitive issue”
for people with disabilities: they have strongly insisted that “we are people
first,” and have demanded that their common humanity be acknowledged rather
than their differences magnified”).
The clear gender asymmetry of “domestic violence” warrants gender-specific
language, and the prevalence of abuse by intimate male partners mandates
attention to the intimate relationship. Consequently, while recognizing that, for
practical purposes, the terms overlap and are often synonymous, the article will
privilege the term “women who live with battering men” to recognize the
gender-specificity and intimate relational basis of “domestic violence.” Martha
R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 25 (1991) (recounting the resistance of some
women to apply the term ‘‘battered woman” to themselves” and noting that, at
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incongruities are particularly lethal.
Following this Introduction, Part I of the article offers a
summary of justifiable homicide and related doctrines, including
the duty to retreat, the requirement of imminence, as well as the
privilege of non-retreat that is reflected in the castle doctrine. Part
II reviews the legal context of Florida’s codification of the castle
doctrine. Part III outlines the elements of a hermeneutic of
inclusive conversation while Part IV unfolds the hermeneutic to
interrogate the disjuncture between the framework of the law of
self-defense and the experiential reality of women who live with
(and sometimes kill)18 battering men.
one conference, several women described themselves with the phrase ‘‘a woman
who used to be married to a battering man”).
18
In 1992, it was estimated that 800 to 1,000 of the women who were
battered each year were charged with the murder of abusive partners. Erich P.
Andersen & Anne Read-Andersen, Constitutional Dimensions of the Battered
Woman Syndrome, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 363, 366 n.16 (1992) [hereinafter Andersen
& Read-Andersen]. Between 1993 and 2001, an intimate partner killed about
thirty-three percent of female murder victims and four percent of male murder
victims. Callie Marie Rennison, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Intimate Partner
Violence,
1993-2001,
(Feb.
2003),
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf (reporting, in a Department of
Justice study, that 1,247 women and 440 men were killed by an intimate partner
in 2000 and that 1,581 women and 708 men were killed by an intimate partner in
1993).
In this article, I articulate a feminist critique of the doctrines structuring the law
of self-defense as applied to women who kill battering men. The article should
not be considered an apology for vigilantism or an exercise in victimism.
BELINDA MORRISSEY, WHEN WOMEN KILL: QUESTIONS OF AGENCY AND
SUBJECTIVITY 25 (2003) (proposing that female killers are depicted as victims,
insane, or monsters and defining “victimism” as the portrayal of people who
have been abused as incapable of acting due to prior abuse); see also Elizabeth
M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 477, 486 (1996)
[hereinafter Schneider, Equality] (arguing that the circumstances of women who
kill battering men “are critical junctures for the intersection of law and social
attitudes because they trigger a national chord of anxiety about ‘‘abuse excuse’
justice and ‘‘feminazi’ vigilantism.”). The article does not assert that claims of
self-defense are appropriate for all women who kill battering men. Schneider,
Equality, supra.
At the same time, I recognize some staggering statistics. At least seventy percent
of women who kill intimate partners do so during an ongoing attack or where
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I. NECESSITY AND JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: OF “TRUE MEN” AND
“HONORABLE MEN”
Justification rests on considerations of necessity and
proportionality.19 In considering claims of justifiable homicide,
there is an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. Holly Maguigan,
Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current
Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 382, 384, 397-99, & nn.68-75
(1991) (concluding, in a study of 223 homicide cases defended by women who
were battered, that seventy-five percent of women were killed during
confrontations with their partners, and also offering sources for data that
between seventy and ninety percent of intimate homicides by women were
victim-precipitated). Furthermore, nearly fifty percent of women are in prison
for killing a relative or intimate, almost sixty percent of female inmates in state
prisons have experienced physical or sexual abuse, and over half of the female
inmates who have been abused were sentenced for homicide crimes. Tracy L.
Snell, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Women in Prison 3, 6 (1991), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/wopris.htm; Lawrence Greenfeld & Tracy
A. Snell, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Women Offenders 1 (1999), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/worpris.pdf (stating, in a Department of
Justice study, that almost six in ten women in state prisons had experienced past
abuse).
While urging care in the interpretation of such statistics, some psychiatrists offer
the Freudian concept of repetition compulsion, whereby people who are
traumatized find themselves reenacting aspects of previous trauma. JUDITH
LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 40-41, 74-75, 110-12 (1992) (also
noting commonalities in the effects of trauma experienced by hostages,
survivors of war, political prisoners, slaves, survivors of child abuse, and
women who have been battered); see also Daniella Levine, Children in Violent
Homes: Effects and Responses, 68 FLA. BAR J. 62, 63 (Oct. 1994) (advising that
seventy-three percent of men in a batterers’ study reported having been
physically or sexually abused as children). A concern raised by some feminist
scholars is that the law constructs women as victims, erasing their agency, or as
rational agents, denying their defenses. E.g., Schneider, Equality, supra at 499;
see also WESTMINSTER, supra note 12, at 178 (defining moral agency in terms
of the capability of humans to carry out ethical actions). However, the curious
congruence of women killing most often during assaults as well as women
killing who have been previously victimized affirms that victimization and
agency are not opposed, but are as profoundly related for women who kill
battering men as are notions of oppression and resistance. Schneider, Equality,
supra at 523.
19
1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 86-88 (1984) (advising
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courts have read several rules into necessity, including variations
of a duty to retreat as well as a requirement that deadly force only
be used when an attack (or harm) is imminent.20 Principles of
retreat and imminence have particular salience in cases in which
women claim justifiable homicide of battering men. As a predicate
to considering the gender implications of retreat and imminence
rules that act as “translators” of necessity, this section of the article
traces the legal development of those doctrines.21
Prior to Bracton, the common law did not recognize defenses
to homicide.22 A person killing by accident, while insane, or in
self-defense was sentenced to the gallows, subject only to a
reprieve by a king’s pardon.23 Where the jury relayed one of the
foregoing circumstances to the king, a pardon was generally
that “[a]ll justification defenses have the same internal structure: triggering
conditions permit a necessary and proportional response”).
20
Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill
Their Batterers, 71 N.C.L. REV. 371, 380-81 (proposing that imminence
“operates as a condition precedent for a finding of necessity”); Nourse,
Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1236 (arguing imminence “often operates as a
proxy for any number of other self-defense factors—for example, strength of
threat, retreat, proportionality, and aggression”); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
AND COMMENTARIES, pt. 1, MPC 3.04 cmt. at 53 (1985) (stating that “[t]here is
a sense in which a duty to retreat may be regarded as a logical derivative of the
underlying justifying principle of self-defense: belief in the necessity of the
protective action”).
21
Rosen, supra note 20, at 381 (characterizing imminence as a “translator”
of necessity).
22
MARTIN R. GARDNER & RICHARD G. SINGER, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 1063 (4th ed. 2004)
[hereinafter GARDNER & SINGER]. Bracton was a legal treatise (circa 1230) that
was named for a royal judge, Henri de Bracton (d. 1268). It was the first legal
treatise in Anglo-American law that developed constitutional and legal theory.
DANIEL CONQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 61-2, 88-92
(1999) (discussing and quoting excerpts of BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (Samuel E. Thorne trans., George E. Woodbine ed.
1968) (1230)).
23
GARDNER & SINGER, supra note 22, at 1063; see also Eugene R.
Milhizer, Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, and What
They Ought to Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 725, 775-76 (2004) (noting that
Bracton’s concept of criminal intent later served as the basis for acquittal for
accident, madness, and immaturity).
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granted.24 At the beginning of the 15th century, these circumstances
became grounds for acquittal and for pardons that were issued as a
matter of course.25 Forfeiture to the king of all land and chattel of a
defendant remained a prerequisite to a pardon.26 In 1532,
Parliament adopted a statute that characterized killings as
“justifiable” when committed by persons to prevent felonies or by
victims who suffered unprovoked deadly attacks on highways or in
homes.27 While an “excusable” killing required forfeiture of land
and chattel, “justifiable” homicide did not.28
By the time of Blackstone, homicide that was committed to
prevent “any forcible and atrocious crime” was justifiable by the
laws of nature and those of England.29 A person committing
justifiable homicide was found to be completely without fault.30 In
contrast, homicide in self-defense was viewed as excusable, rather
than justifiable.31 A person committing excusable homicide was
24

GARDNER & SINGER, supra note 22, at 1063.
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. (referring to 24 Hen. 8, c. 5 (1532) (Eng.)).
28
Id. For a discussion of the theories underlying justification and excuse,
see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 205-19 (3d ed. 2001)
[hereinafter DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING].
29
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *179-80, available at
http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/bla-414.htm
[hereinafter
BLACKSTONE]; see also MODEL PENAL CODE ‘ 3.02 cmt. 1 (1985) (proposing
that, although there were issues as to definition and extent, “necessity seems
clearly to have standing as a common law defense.”).
30
BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *179-80; see also CHARLES E. TORCIA, 2
WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW 181 (15th ed. 1994) [hereinafter WHARTON’S].
31
Blackstone contrasted justifiable homicide to hinder the perpetration of a
capital crime and excusable homicide in self-defense “or se defendendo, upon a
sudden affray . . . whereby a man may protect himself from an assault, or the
like, in the course of a sudden brawl or quarrel, by killing him who assaults
him.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *183-84 (referring to excusable homicide
in self-defense as “chance-medley” or casual affray and “chaud-medley” or
affray in the heat of blood or passion). While noting Blackstone’s “two-headed”
version of self-defense, criminal law scholars have differed in their
interpretations, mostly surrounding the necessity of retreat. Nourse, Subjectivity,
supra note §, at 1244, n.50. Some feminist scholars have argued that the law of
self-defense developed “with an underlying gender bias” that rendered it unable
25
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found to be at some fault and to receive some degree of
punishment.32
Retreat “to the wall” was required of a person who killed
another in excusable self-defense.33 No retreat was required in the
case of justifiable homicide.34 When the practice of forfeiture came
to an end in the early 19th century, legal scholars merged justifiable
prevention of a felony into killing in self-defense and required
retreat even in cases that had previously been considered to be
justifiable.35
Americans were “loath to retreat.”36 In the 1800s, no-retreat
to deal justly with women who kill abusive men. Developments in the Law—
Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1575-76
(1993) [hereinafter Developments] (characterizing the development of selfdefense doctrine with two paradigms in mind—a sudden attack by a stranger or
intruder and a dispute between two persons of equal size and strength).
32
BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *183-84; see also WHARTON’S, supra
note 30, at 225.
33
“The law requires that the person, who kills another in his own defense,
should have retreated as far as he conveniently or safely can, to avoid the
violence of the assault, before he turns upon his assailant. . . . The party
assaulted must therefore flee as far as he conveniently can, either by reason of
some wall ditch, or other impediment. . . . “ BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at
*183-84; see also Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1244, n.50 (arguing that,
to Blackstone, retreat was required only where there was “fault” for entering the
fray). The phrase “retreat to the wall” finds its origin in an early English case in
which the defendant had been driven to a wall between two houses, beyond
which he was not able to pass; there he stood and killed the other in self-defense.
GARDNER & SINGER, supra note 22, at 1070 (referring to FITZHERBERT, GRAND
ABRIDGMENT, C. and P.C. No. 284 (1328)). Fitzherbert was a judge of the
Common Pleas from 1522-1538 and a “writer of the highest authority.” Sykes v.
Director of Public Prosecutions, 3 All Eng. Rep. 33 (House of Lords 1961).
34
GARDNER & SINGER, supra note 22, at 1069 (noting that “the fully
innocent target of an unprovoked attack could stand his ground and kill”).
35
Id; see also WHARTON’S, supra note 30, at 181 (citing 3 STEPHEN, A
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 11, 77 (1883)) (advising that the
penalty of forfeiture was abolished in 1828).
36
Stephen P. Aggergaard, Case Note, Retreat from Reason: How
Minnesota’s New No-Retreat Rule Confuses the Law and Cries for Alteration,
29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 657, 659 (2002) (reciting George Washington’s
scolding of Major General Charles Lee for “an unnecessary, disorderly, and
shameful retreat” during the Battle of Momouth in the Revolutionary War); see
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rules became common in the Colonies and the Midwest.37 An 1876
Ohio Supreme Court decision advised that “a true man, who is
without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by
violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him
enormous bodily harm.”38 However, retreat was more commonly
required in the Northeast and the South.39 In 1903, Harvard
Professor Joseph Beale articulated the premises for the rule of
retreat:
A really honorable man, a man of truly refined and elevated
feeling, would perhaps always regret the apparent
cowardice of retreat, but he would regret ten times more,
after the excitement of a contest was past, the thought that
he had the blood of a fellow-being on his hands. It is
undoubtedly distasteful to retreat; but it is ten times more
disgraceful to kill.40
One hundred years later, state law reflects the division between
the “true man” privilege of non-retreat and the “honorable man”
duty of retreat to avoid deadly confrontation.41
also L.S. Rogers, Annotation, Homicide: Extent of Premises Which May be
Defended Without Retreat Under Right of Self-Defense, 52 A.L.R.2D 1458
(1957) (noting a “general revulsion in America to so unnatural a standard of
conduct” of retreating from an assailant).
37
Aggergaard, supra note 36, at 659-60; see also Susan Estrich, Defending
Women, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1430, 1431-32 (1990) (arguing self-defense rules
exist not so much to define manly behavior as to limit manly instincts—in order
to preserve human life).
38
Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199-200 (Ohio 1876); see also Runyan
v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 84 (1877) (contrasting the “ancient doctrine” of retreat with
the “weight of modern authority” to meet force with force when a person is
violently assaulted). The United States Supreme Court cited both decisions with
approval in Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 560-62 (1895) (holding that
the lower court erred in ruling that the accused, while on his premises outside of
his residence, was under a legal duty to retreat).
39
Aggergaard, supra note 36, at 660.
40
Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L.
REV. 567, 581 (1903).
41
Compare Carpenter, supra note 3, at 663 (stating “[m]ost jurisdictions do
not impose the duty to retreat on one who is unlawfully attacked, whether in
public or private space”) with Aggergaard, supra note 36, at 661-62 (2002)
(proposing, as of 2002, that nineteen jurisdictions generally do not require
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retreat, twenty-nine jurisdictions “have resisted the stand-your-ground ethos”
and require retreat, and three jurisdictions “claim a ‘middle ground’ that shuns a
categorical duty to retreat but still scrutinizes the defender’s behavior.”); see
also DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING , supra note 28, at 226 n.36 (noting the
“current trend appears to favor movement away from the no-retreat requirement
rule.”).
Research indicates that twenty-two jurisdictions could fairly be considered to
require a defendant to retreat prior to using deadly force, where retreat can be
done in complete safety. Alabama: ALA. CODE ‘ 13A-3-23 (2005); Alaska:
ALASKA STAT. ‘ 11.81.335 (2005); Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. ‘ 5-2-607
(2005); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT ‘ 53a-19 (2005); Delaware: DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, ‘ 464 (2005); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. ‘ 703-304 (2004); Iowa:
IOWA CODE ‘ 704.3 (2003); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.17-A, ‘ 108 (2005);
Maryland: Burch v. State, 696 A.2d 443, 458 (Md. 1997) (“One of the elements
of the defense of self-defense is the duty of the defendant to retreat or avoid
danger if such means were within his power and consistent with his safety.”);
Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Gagne, 326 N.E.2d 907, 910 (Mass. 1975)
(“[T]he defendant recognizes that we follow the rule that a person attacked with
deadly force must retreat whenever it is possible to do so in safety”); see also
Commonwealth v. Niemic, 696 N.E.2d 117, 121 (Mass. 1998) (“The right of
self-defense does not accrue to a person until he has availed all proper means to
avoid physical combat. Thus, if a defendant has an opportunity to retreat but
fails to do so, the defendant has no privilege to use force in self-defense.”);
Minnesota: State v. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d 897, 899 (Mn. 1999); Missouri:
State v. Jordan, 646 S.W.2d 747, 751 (Mo. 1983); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. ‘
28-1409 (2005); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ‘ 627:4 (2005); New
Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. ‘ 2C:3-4 (West 2005); see also State v. Gartland, 694
A.2d 564, 571 (N.J. 1997) (noting statutory duty to retreat and commending to
the legislature “consideration of the application of the retreat doctrine in the case
of a spouse battered in her own home.”); New York: N.Y. PENAL LAW ‘ 35.15
(McKinney 2005); North Carolina: State v. Stevenson, 344 S.E.2d 334, 335
(N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (“The duty to retreat requires a victim of an assault to
retreat to the wall before using deadly force in self-defense.”); North Dakota:
N.D. CENT. CODE ‘ 12.1-05-07 (2005); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ‘ 2901.05
(West 2005); Pennsylvania: 18 PA. STAT. ANN. ‘ 505 (2005); Rhode Island:
State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 961 (R.I. 1995); South Carolina: State v. Long,
480 S.E.2d 62 (S.C. 1997) (“To establish self-defense, a defendant must
establish . . . he has no other probable means of avoiding the danger. However, a
person attacked on his own premises, without fault, has the right to claim
immunity from the law of retreat.”).
Research also indicates that twenty-one jurisdictions could fairly be considered
not to impose a duty to retreat before a defendant may resort to deadly force.
Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. ‘ 13-411 (2004) (“B. There is no duty to retreat
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before threatening or using deadly physical force justified by subsection A of
this section.”). See also State v. Korzep, 799 P.2d 831 (Ariz. 1990); California:
People v. Collins, 11 Cal. Rptr. 504, 513-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); People v.
Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996) (citing jury instruction); Colorado: COLO.
REV. STAT. ‘ 18-1-704 (2004); Harris v. People, 75 P. 427 (Colo. 1904); People
v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 348 (Colo. 2001); Florida: FLA. STAT. ‘ 776.012 (2005)
(effective Oct. 1, 2005); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. ‘ 16-3-21 (2004); Johnson v.
State, 315 S.E.2d 871 (Ga. 1984); Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. ‘ 18-4009 (2005);
State v. McGreevey, 105 P. 1047, 1051 (Idaho 1909); Illinois: 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/7-1 (2005); People v. Bush, 111 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. 1953); People v.
Rodriguez, 543 N.E.2d 324, 328 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. ‘
35-41-3-2 (LexisNexis 2004); Page v. State, 40 N.E. 745, 745-746 (Ind. 1895);
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. ‘ 21-3211 (2005); State v. Scobee, 748 P.2d 862
(Kan. 1988); Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. ‘ 503.050 (West 2004); Sikes v.
Commonwealth, 200 S.W.2d 956, 960 (Ky. 1947); Mississippi: MISS. CODE
ANN. ‘ 97-3-15 (2005); Haynes v. State, 451 So. 2d 227 (Miss. 1984); Cook v.
State, 467 So. 2d 203, 211 n.7 (Miss. 1985); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. ‘ 453-102 (2004); State v. Merk, 164 P.655, 658 (Mont. 1917); Nevada: NEV. REV.
STAT. ‘ 200.120 (2004); State v. Kennedy, 7 Nev. 375 (1872) (decision under
former similar statute); Runion v. State, 13 P.3d 52 (Nev. 2000); New Mexico:
N.M. U.J.I. CR. 14-5190 (2005) (jury instruction states, in part: “A person who
is threatened with an attack need not retreat. In the exercise of his right of self
defense, he may stand his ground and defend himself.”); Oklahoma: Neal v.
State, 597 P.2d 334, 337 (Ok. Crim. App. 1979) (“The law in Oklahoma is clear:
There is no duty to retreat if one is threatened with bodily harm.”); Tennessee:
TENN. CODE ANN. ‘ 39-11-611 (2005) (“(a) . . . [t]here is no duty to retreat
before a person threatens or uses force.”); State v. Renner, 912 S.W.2d 701
(Tenn. 1995) (“Under the ‘true man’ doctrine, one need not retreat from the
threatened attack of another even though one may safely do so; neither must one
pause and consider whether a reasonable person might think it possible to safely
flee rather than to attack and disable or kill the assailant.”); Utah: UTAH CODE
ANN. ‘ 76-2-402 (2005) (“(3) A person does not have a duty to retreat from the
force or threatened force described in Subsection (1) in a place where that
person has lawfully entered or remained, except as provided in Subsection
(2)(c)” (pertaining to aggressors and combat by agreement)); State v. Mares, 192
P.2d 861 (Utah 1948); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, ‘ 2305 (2004); State v.
Hatcher, 706 A.2d 429, 435 (Vt. 1997); Virginia: McCoy v. Commonwealth, 99
S.E. 644, 645 (Va. 1919); Washington: State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 316
(Wash. 1984); West Virginia: State v. Crawford, 66 S.E. 110, 113 (W. Va.
1909).
Research indicates that eight jurisdictions may be considered to occupy a
“middle ground,” in which retreat is a factor in determining whether deadly
force is justified. District of Columbia: United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222
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The Model Penal Code articulates the rule of retreat, as
follows: “The use of deadly force is not justifiable . . . if . . . the
actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force

(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1007 (1973) (“Before a person can avail
himself of the plea of self-defense against the charge of homicide, he must do
everything in his power, consistent with his safety, to avoid the danger and
avoid the necessity of taking life.”); Cooper v. United States, 512 A.2d 1002
(D.C. 1986) (“The middle ground approach to self-defense imposes no duty to
retreat, but it permits the jury to consider whether a defendant, if he safely could
have avoided further encounter by stepping back or walking away, was actually
or apparently in imminent danger of bodily harm. In short, this rule permits the
jury to determine if the defendant acted too hastily, was too quick to pull the
trigger.”); Louisiana: State v. Brown, 414 So. 2d 726, 729 (La. 1982)
(“Although there is not an unqualified duty to retreat, the possibility of escape is
a recognized factor in determining whether or not a defendant had the
reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to avoid the danger.”);
Michigan: People v. Riddle, 649 N.W.2d 30, 39 (Mich. 2002) (“An accused’s
conduct in failing to retreat, or to otherwise avoid the intended harm, may in
some circumstances, other than those in which the accused is the victim of a
sudden violent attack, indicate a lack of reasonableness or necessity in resorting
to deadly force in self-defense.”); Oregon: State v. Charles, 647 P.2d 897, 903
(Or. 1982) (“This court has never laid down an absolute rule endorsing either
‘retreat’ or ‘no retreat’ as the rule in Oregon . . . The duty has depended on the
threat posed and the facts of each case.”); South Dakota: Compare State v.
Stumbaugh, 132 N.W. 666, 674 (S.D. 1911) (“The law, as stated in the old law
books, is that the person assaulted must retreat to the wall or ditch, meaning, of
course, he must go as far as he can with safety, before he would be justified in
taking the life of his assailant.”), overruled on other grounds, State v. Waff, 373
N.W.2d 18, 22 (S.D. 1985), with State v. Wilcox, 204 N.W. 369, 373 (S.D.
1925) (“[H]e was not obliged to retreat, nor to consider whether he could safely
retreat, but was entitled to stand his ground. . . .”); Texas: TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. ‘ 9.32 (Vernon 2004) (“ (a) A person is justified in using deadly force . . .
(2) if a reasonable person in the actor’s situation would not have retreated . . . “);
Wisconsin: State v. Wenger, 593 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999), rev.
denied, 599 N.W. 2d 409 (Wis. 1999) (“While Wisconsin has no statutory duty
to retreat, whether the opportunity to retreat was available may be a
consideration regarding whether the defendant reasonably believed the force
used was necessary to prevent or terminate the interference.”); Wyoming:
Garcia v. State, 667 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Wyo. 1983) (“Prior to resorting to deadly
force, a defendant has a duty to pursue reasonable alternatives under the
circumstances. Among those reasonable alternatives may be the duty to
retreat.”).
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with complete safety by retreating. . . .”42 Some legal scholars have
questioned whether, in the era of the firearm,43 a defender can ever
avoid using deadly force “with complete safety” and whether the
Code has only “paid homage to the retreat requirement, while
allowing virtually every defendant to stand her ground.”44
Of the jurisdictions that have adopted a duty of retreat, most of
them also recognize the “castle doctrine,” which provides an
exception to the retreat rule and authorizes the use of deadly force
by a person who is protecting her home and its inhabitants from
attack.45 The castle doctrine harkens back to the feudal precept that
42

Section 3.04(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Penal Code states: “The use of deadly
force is not justifiable under this Section unless the actor believes that such force
is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping
or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if . . . (ii)
the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with
complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a
person asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a demand that he
abstain from any action that he has no duty to take . . . .” MODEL PENAL CODE ‘
3.04(2)(b)(ii) at 31 (1985). The Model Penal Code places the use of defensive
force against felonious attack within “a single rule, not varied when the case is
viewed as one of self-defense or one of crime prevention.” Id. cmt. at 38.
Consequently, the Code disavows justification for the use of force “in the
absence of belief by the actor in its necessity for the protective purpose he
attempts to serve.” Id.
43
The .50 caliber rifle, available on the civilian market, is able to
“penetrate light armor, down helicopters, destroy commercial aircraft, and blast
through rail cars and bulk storage tanks filled with explosive or toxic
chemicals,”all from a mile away. Tom Diaz, Clear and Present Danger
(Violence
Policy
Center),
June
2005,
at
iii,
available
at
http:www.vpc.org/studies/50danger.pdf; see also .50 Caliber Danger (NBC
Dateline television broadcast June 19, 2005).
44
GARDNER & SINGER, supra note 22, at 1070-71.
45
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 209 (7th ed. 1999). One articulation of the
castle doctrine provides: “[T]hose who are unlawfully attacked in their homes
have no duty to retreat, because their home offers them the safety and security
that retreat is intended to provide. They may lawfully stand ground instead and
use deadly force if necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily injury,
or the commission of a forcible felony.” Carpenter, supra note 3, at 656-57 &
n.12 (concluding that this statement of the castle doctrine “merges traditional
notions of the defense of habitation and self-defense in the home.”). Carpenter
also argues that, rather than providing a “settled exception to the generalized
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an “Englishman’s home is his castle.”46 In 1895, the United States
Supreme Court endorsed the principle, advising that the “weight of
modern authority . . . establishes the doctrine that, when a person,
being without fault and in a place where he has a right to be, is
violently assaulted, he may, without retreating, repel force by
force. . . .”47 In expressing the sentiment underlying the doctrine,
Judge Cardozo insisted:
It is not now and never has been the law that a man assailed
in his own dwelling is bound to retreat. If assailed there, he
may stand his ground and resist the attack. He is under no
duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from
his own home.48
The Model Penal Code recognizes other exceptions to the duty
to retreat. Neither a person attacked at her place of work, nor a
public officer engaged in the performance of duties, nor a person
justified in using force to make an arrest or prevent an escape is
required to retreat.49 Some state legislative bodies have recently
enacted “Make-My-Day,” “Shoot-the-Burglar,” and “Shoot-theCarjacker” laws.50 The latter justifies a homicide committed
duty to retreat, the Castle Doctrine has evolved into a confusing patchwork of
rules.” Id. at 657.
46
R. v. Southwark London Borough Council, [2002] EWHC 153 (Q.B.
2002) (referring to Sendil’s Case [1585] 7 Co. Rep. 6a and quoting Semayne’s
Case [1604] 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b as follows: “The house of every one is to him
as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as
for his repose.”); see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at 4:223 (“And the law
of England has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s
house, that it stiles is his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with
impunity).
47
Beard, 158 U.S. at 562 (noting the accused was where he had a right to
be, to wit: “on his own premises, constituting a part of his residence at home, at
the time the deceased approached him in a threatening manner. . . . “).
48
People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914); see also Weiand v.
State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1050 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d
824, 827 (Fla. 1965) for the proposition that “[w]hen in his home he has
‘retreated to the wall’”).
49
MODEL PENAL CODE ‘ 3.04 cmt. at 52-3 (1985).
50
In 1985, Colorado adopted a defense of habitation act, also known as the
“Make-My-Day” law, in which deadly force is justified against a person making
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against a person who is attempting to make unlawful entry into a
vehicle if the actor reasonably believes that deadly force is
“necessary to prevent the entry or to compel the intruder to
leave.”51 Under this Louisiana statute, there is no stated
requirement that the defender either be in danger or believe that
she is in danger of receiving injury.52
On the privilege of non-retreat in the home, courts have
endorsed varying views regarding the applicability of the privilege
to co-occupants and invited guests.53 In recapitulating a duty to
an unlawful entry and committing a crime in a dwelling where the occupant
“reasonably believes that such other person might use any physical force, no
matter how slight, against any occupant.” See COLO. REV. STAT. 18-1-704.5(2)(4) (2004) (also providing immunity from criminal prosecution and civil
liability); see also People v. Janes, 982 P.2d 300 (Colo. 1987) (affirming
reversal of a manslaughter conviction where the instruction regarding
defendant’s “Make-My-Day” defense failed to explain that the state effectively
had to disprove the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt). Louisiana
adopted a defense of habitation law, also known as the “Shoot-the-Burglar” act,
in 1982. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:20(3)-(4) (1983) (creating the crime of
“unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling” without a specific intent
requirement); see also John S. Baker, Jr., Criminal Law, 44 LA. L. REV. 279,
288-89 (1983) (critiquing the act and proposing that the measure was a
legislative reaction to judicial reversal of burglary convictions). In the “Shootthe-Carjacker” law, Louisiana expanded the defense of premises to automobiles.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:20(3)-(4) (2004); see also Stephanie Grace,
Carjacker Law Debated as Too Much, Too Little, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 8,
1997, at A1 (discussing legal and political changes effected by the act and
reporting the debate as a “political Rorschach test”). For a discussion of these
legislative elaborations of the defense of premises doctrine, see Stuart P. Green,
Castles and Carjackers: Proportionality and the Use of Deadly Force in
Defense of Dwellings and Vehicles, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (1999). For a
discussion of the traditional defense of habitation, see MODEL PENAL CODE ‘
3.06 & cmt. at 91 (1985) (noting limitations on the use of deadly force in
defense of premises).
51
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:20(3)-(4) (2004) (also revising the “imminent
danger” standard to “reasonable belief” and eliminating the duty to retreat).
52
Green, supra note 50, at 3.
53
While noting a split among the state courts, an annotation advises that a
majority of courts that have adopted the castle doctrine also considers the
“principle equally applicable when the assailant is a cohabitant.” Linda A.
Sharp, Annotation, Homicide: Duty to Retreat Where Assailant and Assailed
Share the Same Living Quarters, 67 A.L.R.5TH 637 (1999). However, a number

KOONS MACROED 07-30-06.DOC

636

7/30/2006 12:34 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

retreat and adopting the cohabitant exception to the castle doctrine,
some courts have recognized the policy that two people who share
a residence have “equal rights to be in the ‘castle’” and neither has
the right to eject the other.54
Related to the duty to retreat is imminence. As commonly
formulated, to claim self-defense to a charge of homicide, a
defendant must reasonably believe “that he is in imminent danger
of losing his life or suffering great bodily harm.”55 Unlike the duty
to retreat, which has an earlier common law lineage, the
requirement of imminence began to be expressed in the late
eighteenth century.56
To support the element of imminence in self-defense, the
perceived danger need not be actual.57 The defendant must have a
reasonable belief that she is in danger, which is not justified unless
of cases reach a contrary result and distinguish an encounter between two
occupants from an encounter between an occupant and an intruder, reasoning
that “since both the assailed and the assailant are on common ground and neither
has the right to eject the other, the person assailed is under a duty to retreat
before killing the assailant.” Id. (identifying nine jurisdictions that affirm a
common law or statutory duty to retreat for cohabitants: District of Columbia,
Florida, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina); see also Weiand v. State, 732
So. 2d 1044, 1051 (Fla. 1999) (citing Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and West Virginia as
requiring retreat of cohabitants at the time of its decision in State v. Bobbitt, 415
So. 2d 724 (1982)).
54
E.g., State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d at 726, overruled by Weiand, 732 So.
2d at 1044; see also Carpenter, supra note 3, at 657-58 (discussing the policies
underlying the debate over the castle doctrine’s applicability to cohabitants and
invitees).
55
Rosen, supra note 20, at 378; see also WHARTON’S, supra note 30, at
181 (providing the following standard: “A defendant may kill in self-defense
when he reasonably believes he is in imminent danger of losing his life or
suffering great bodily harm.”); DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 28, at
222 (noting that imminence is an aspect of the necessity component of selfdefense).
56
Blackstone advised that self-defense arose only in cases that were
“sudden and violent . . . when certain and immediate suffering would be the
consequence of waiting for the assistance of the law.” BLACKSTONE, supra note
29, at 4:14; see also Rosen, supra note 20, at 387 n.45.
57
WHARTON’S, supra note 30, at 181.
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some act has been performed that manifests an intent to expose the
defendant to such danger.58 In cases in which a defendant
reasonably anticipates that the other person intends to kill her,
many courts require the defendant to wait until an act is performed
that indicates that the homicidal attack is imminent.59 In cases in
which the danger has ceased to exist, such as where an assailant
has abandoned an attack, a defendant cannot claim justifiable
killing.60
On this historic template, Supreme Courts of several states,
including Florida, have recently grappled with the consequences
for victims of domestic violence of the duty to retreat that is
imbricated in the cohabitor exception to the castle doctrine.61 As
will be discussed in the following section, the Florida legislature
could have bolstered the law’s resolve for the safety of women
who live with battering men.62 Instead, the legislature focused on
strengthening the castle doctrine for men carrying concealed

58

Id. at 184.
Id. at 188. The Model Penal Code states as follows: “[T]he use of force
upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such
force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the
use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.” MODEL
PENAL CODE ‘ 3.04(1) (1985); see also Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at
1242 (advising that, by shifting the focus from the threat to the response
(“immediately necessary”), the Model Penal Code attempted to soften the notion
that “the time for defense is now. The defender cannot wait any longer”).
60
WHARTON’S, supra note 30, at 190.
61
E.g., Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1051 (Fla. 1999) (receding from
imposing on cohabitants a duty to retreat from the residence and adopting a
limited duty to retreat within the residence); State v. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339,
1343 (Ohio 1997) (finding error in an instruction that a cohabitant assailant had
a duty to retreat and noting in cases of domestic violence that survivors had
already “retreated to the wall” many times); State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564
(N.J. 1997) (requiring tailored instruction on statutory duty to retreat for
cohabitants); see also State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 402 (Minn. 2001)
(adopting a rule of non-retreat for co-occupants, but placing the absence of a
duty to retreat within an obligation to act reasonably and ruling that the trial
court’s instruction was harmless error).
62
For discussion of the use of the phrase “women who live with battering
men,” see supra note 17.
59
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weapons on the street.63
II. GUNSMOKE OVER THE SUNSHINE STATE
Two major policy steps were taken in Florida prior to
refashioning the castle doctrine. The first measure, adopted in
1987, was a statewide conceal-carry gun licensure act.64 Concealed
weapons laws fall into two categories: discretionary (or “may
issue”) systems in which licenses are granted only to citizens who
establish a compelling need to carry a gun and non-discretionary
(or “shall issue”) licensing systems in which authorities must
provide a license to any applicant who meets stated criteria.65 In
1985, the NRA announced it would lobby for “shall issue” laws in
specified states.66 Florida was one of the first states to move from a
“may issue” to a “shall issue” law, rendering its conceal-carry
system among the most permissive in the nation.67
Since the enactment of the law, one million concealed weapon
licenses have been issued in the state; 341,974 of those licenses
63

See Angel, supra note 16, at 320 (arguing the duty of retreat for cooccupants disadvantages women because most women are assaulted and killed
within their homes by intimate male partners, while most men are assaulted and
killed outside their homes by strangers); Daszuta, supra note 15, at 4 (reporting
that approximately eighty-five percent of the current conceal-carry licenses in
Florida are issued to men).
64
See FLA. STAT. ‘ 790.06 (2005). The legislature found it necessary to
regulate “concealed weapons or firearms for self-defense to ensure that no
honest, law-abiding person who qualifies under the provisions of this section is
subjectively or arbitrarily denied his or her rights.” FLA. STAT. ‘ 790.06(15)
(also directing that the section be liberally construed “to carry out the
constitutional right to bear arms for self-defense”); see also Daszuta, supra note
15, at 4 (discussing the NRA’s seven-year battle to pass the act, the veto by
Governor Graham in 1986, the re-adoption of the bill in 1987, and its signing by
a new Governor in 1987).
65
David McDowall et al., Easing Concealed Firearms Laws: Effects on
Homicide in Three States, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 193-94 (1995)
[hereinafter McDowall].
66
Id.
67
Id; see also George Volsky, Guns in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
1987, at 26 (reporting that the law, “one of the most liberal in the country,”
would be watched closely to see if there is any effect on crime statistics).
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were valid as of March 31, 2005.68 Before the enactment of the
law, 16,000 persons in the state had licenses to carry guns.69
Florida’s law became the blueprint for dozens of states to pass
similar laws and ignited the debate over concealed weapons as a
deterrent for violent crime.70
The second measure came in 1999 when the state Supreme
Court modified the duty to retreat from a residence before deadly

68

Daszuta, supra note 15, at 4.
Myra MacPherson, Pistol-Packin’ Populace: Florida Up in Arms,
WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1987, at E1.
70
Goddard, supra note 6, at 2. But see Richard Getchell, Comment,
Carrying Concealed Weapons in Self-Defense: Florida Adopts Uniform
Regulations for the Issuance of Concealed Weapons Permits, 15 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 751, 752 (1987) (noting the new act was “expressly intended as a selfdefense bill, not as a deterrent.”). A study of the frequency of firearm homicides
in the urban areas of Florida, Mississippi, and Oregon resulted in two
conclusions: the stronger conclusion that “shall issue” laws do not reduce
homicides and the weaker conclusion that “shall issue” laws raise levels of
firearms murders. McDowall, supra note 65, at 202-03. But see Ryan S. Andrus,
The Concealed Handgun Debate and the Need for State-to-State Concealed
Handgun Reciprocity, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 129, 132-33 (2000) (discussing the
major empirical studies that support and oppose the proposition that concealed
handguns deter crime and concluding that existing research provides “little
support” for the fears of opponents); see also MacPherson, supra note 69, at 6
(proposing that the “strongest argument” for controlling handgun sales arises
from comparing the U.S. murder rate with that of countries that have highly
restrictive handgun laws: “A 1986 study of cities of comparable size showed 67
handgun murders in London, 1,582 in New York.”). Compare U.S. v. Miller,
307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (interpreting the Second Amendment as relating to the
preservation or efficiency of an organized state militia), with U.S. v. Emerson,
270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.W. 907 (2002) (holding that
the Second Amendment protects the right of individuals “to privately possess
and bear their own firearms”); Robert J. Spitzer, The Second Amendment “Right
to Bear Arms” and United States v. Emerson, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 19
(2003) (proposing that the Supreme Court (in Miller) and “over forty lower
court rulings are correct in embracing the collective or militia view of the
amendment. The Emerson majority . . . fails to dislodge the formers’ reasoning
or conclusions.”). Despite others’ misgivings about the validity of Emerson,
then-Attorney General Ashcroft embraced Emerson as “the policy of the Justice
Department” and directed all ninety-three United States Attorneys to adopt
Emerson as the law of the United States. Id. at 2 n.4.
69
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force may be used against a co-occupant.71 From 1982 to 1999,
Florida had followed a rule of retreat in co-occupant cases,
reasoning that the castle doctrine did not apply because cohabiting
spouses had equal rights to occupy the residence.72 In Weiand v.
State, the court receded from requiring a full retreat from the
premises prior to using deadly force in self-defense.73 Two reasons
were cited by the court to sustain this conclusion. First, the court
characterized earlier precedent as having been “grounded upon the
sanctity of property and possessory rights, rather than the sanctity
of human life.”74 Second, the court recognized that “imposing a
duty to retreat from the residence has a potentially damaging effect
on victims of domestic violence claiming self-defense.”75
However, to satisfy any concern that eliminating a duty to
retreat might “invite violence,” the court adopted a limited duty to
retreat within the residence where reasonably possible without
increasing the danger of death or great bodily harm.76 The court
also determined that it was inappropriate to distinguish between
victims of domestic violence and other defendants who were
71

Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1056-57 (Fla. 1999). Kathleen Weiand
was convicted of second-degree murder in the killing of her husband, Todd, who
had beaten and choked her during their three-year relationship. Id. at 1048.
During the pendency of her appeal to the Supreme Court and after serving four
years in prison, she was granted executive clemency. Id. at 1047; Sue Carlton,
Battered Spouse Case is Closed, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 27, 1999, at 1B.
72
Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d at 726 (reasoning the cohabitants “had equal rights to
be in the ‘castle’ and neither had the legal right to eject the other.”).
73
Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1051 (adopting Justice Overton’s dissent in
Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d at 726).
74
Id. at 1052.
75
Id. at 1051.
76
Id. at 1056. While asserting that “the availability of the nonretreat
instruction does not ‘invite’ violence,” the court adopted a “middle ground”
instruction to satisfy “any concern that eliminating a duty to retreat might invite
violence.” Id. (noting a lack of empirical data that demonstrated any correlation
between eliminating the duty to retreat from the home and an increase in
domestic violence). Cf. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, AN INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIAN
ETHICS 197 (1935) (“Political problems drive pure moralists to despair because
in them the freedom of the spirit must come to terms with the contingencies of
nature, the moral ideal must find a proper mechanism for its incarnation, and the
ideal principle must be sacrificed to guarantee its partial realization.”).
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attacked in a residence by a co-occupant.77
It was in this legal context in 2005 that the Governor signed
into law the new statutory right to stand one’s ground outside of a
dwelling, residence, or automobile and “meet force with force”
where a person “reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to
prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another
or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.”78 Where a
person against whom defensive force is used was unlawfully and
forcefully entering (or had entered) a dwelling, residence, or
occupied vehicle, the act creates a presumption of fear of death or
great bodily harm for the defender using deadly force.79 However,
77

Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1057. The impetus for the court’s reconsideration
of Bobbitt was “our increased knowledge of the complexities of domestic
violence.” Id. However, the court also determined not to distinguish between
cotenants and invitees. Id. (adopting a broad reading of the position advanced by
Justice Overton’s dissent in Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d at 726).
78
S.B. 436, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2005) (creating Fla. Stat. ‘
776.013(3), referring to “[a] person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and
who is attacked in [a place other than a dwelling, residence, or vehicle] where he
or she has a right to be”). This section of the statute, among others, reflects
apparent gender distortion, in that men are generally assaulted and killed outside
their homes by strangers, but women are generally assaulted and killed in their
homes by male partners. Angel, supra note 16, at 320.
79
S.B. 436, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2005) (creating Fla. Stat. ‘
776.013(1)(a)). The staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee noted that the
presumptions created by the act “appear to be conclusive,” not rebuttable. STAFF
OF SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 107TH LEG. SESS., SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS
AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT 6 (Feb. 25, 2005). “Dwelling” is defined as
a “building or conveyance of any kind . . . designed to be occupied by people
lodging therein at night.” S.B. 436, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2005) (creating
Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.013(5)(a)). “Residence” is a “dwelling in which a person resides
either temporarily or permanently or is visiting as an invited guest.” Id. (creating
Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.013(5)(b)). With these definitions, in a case where a man has
been invited to a woman’s home on one occasion and thereafter becomes
abusive, a woman may not be able to claim the benefit of the presumption. The
breadth of the definitions may even lead courts to consider a man in such a
circumstance to be a lawful resident. Cf. State v. James, 867 So. 2d 414, 416 n.3
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (noting the trial judge’s response to the claim for
extension of the castle doctrine to a man who had been in an apartment on two
occasions, once for consensual sex: “I expect home to be where you hang your
hat and in this case, as I understand it, the defendant was doing more than
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the presumption is unavailing where the person against whom
force is used “has the right to be in or is a lawful resident of the
dwelling, residence, or vehicle, such an owner, lessee, or
titleholder.”80 By disallowing the presumption for cohabitants, the
legislative scheme significantly disfavors women who live with
battering men.81
Furthermore, the act provides for immunity from criminal and
civil actions that arise out of the justifiable use of deadly force.82 In
a criminal investigation, law enforcement officers are prohibited
from arresting the person using force unless there is probable cause
to believe that unlawful force was employed.83 In a civil action
successfully defended by a person who is immune from
prosecution, the court is required to order attorney’s fees, costs,
compensation for loss of income, and all expenses incurred in
defense of the action.84
In reviewing the act’s abrogation of the common law duty to
retreat before a person may resort to deadly force, legislative staff
analyses noted some confusion regarding the duty to retreat.85
hanging his hat; he was hanging his pants. So, I think he has the right to the
same kind of protection in that home.”).
80
See S.B. 436, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2005) (creating Fla. Stat. ‘
776.013(2)(A)).
81
Most violence toward women comes from cohabiting male partners. E.g.,
Angel, supra note 16, at 320. The legislation only addresses women who live
with battering men in those limited cases where the women have obtained
injunctions for protection or no-contact orders. See S.B. 436, 107th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Fl. 2005) (creating Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.013(2)(A)). (providing that the
presumption of fear of death or great bodily harm does not apply where the
person against whom defensive force is used is a lawful resident and where
“there is not an injunction for protection from domestic violence or a written
pretrial supervision order of no contact against that person.”). Presumably,
where a person enters a dwelling in violation of an injunction for protection or
an order of no contact, the presumption of fear of death or great bodily harm
would apply, not because of the behavior of the perpetrator, but because of the
unlawfulness of the entry, given the court orders.
82
Id. (creating Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.032(1))..
83
Id. (creating Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.032(2)).
84
Id. (creating Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.032(3)).
85
The Senate Staff of the Judiciary Committee noted that the bill abrogates
the common law duty to retreat. STAFF OF SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
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More significantly, however, the act purported to eliminate the
duty to retreat only where the presumptions of fear of death or
great bodily harm are operable or where the harm is imminent.86
Women who live with battering men are caught on both prongs of
the statute. First, the favorable presumptions are unavailing to
women who live with battering men because the presumptions
contemplate stranger violence (through unlawful entry), rather than
violence at the hands of intimate partners.87 Second, the standard
of imminence effectively functions as a retreat rule. While retreat
rules invite juries to consider why defendants did not leave, the
107TH LEG. SESS., SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT
STATEMENT 5-7 (Feb. 25, 2005) (stating, too, that “a person will no longer have
any duty to retreat, unless the person is not in a place where he or she is lawfully
entitled to be.”). The analysis also suggested that, by cross-referencing the
section on self-defense in a dwelling, residence, or vehicle that does not speak to
a duty to retreat, the committee substitute is “somewhat confusing in the way
that the Florida common law duty to retreat is completely abrogated.” Id. at 7-8.
The Senate Staff of the Criminal Justice Committee proposed that the
“elimination of the duty to retreat will arguably effectively extend the ‘castle
doctrine’ to anyone who is an invited guest (i.e., has the right to be at the
location) and could create confusion with regard to whose right to be in a
particular location is paramount for the purposes of justifiable use of force.”
STAFF OF SENATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMITTEE, 107TH LEG. SESS., SENATE
STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT 7 (Feb. 10, 2005).
86
One section of the statute was amended to state, in pertinent part:
“However, the person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not have a
duty to retreat only if: (A) He or she reasonably believes that such force is
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself
or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony; or (B)
Under those circumstances permitted pursuant to s. 776.013.” S.B. 436, 107th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2005) (amending Fla. Stat. ‘ 776.012). Another section
described as pertaining to “use of force in defense of others” was amended to
state: “However, the person is justified in the use of deadly force only if he or
she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the imminent
commission of a forcible felony. A person does not have a duty to retreat if the
person is in a place where he or she has a right to be.” Id. (amending Fla. Stat. ‘
776.031).
87
See,e.g., Bachman & Saltzman, supra note 4, at 3 (reporting findings of a
Department of Justice study that men were more likely to encounter violence by
strangers, while women were much more likely to face violence by intimate
partners).
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requirement of imminence encourages juries to ask the same
question, although in a temporal form—whether defendants had
the time to leave.88 Consequently, by asserting a standard of
imminence, the legislature adopted a “silent retreat rule,” taking
back what it claimed to disavow.89
What effect do principles such as imminence and retreat have
on women who live with battering men—and on their standing in
the criminal justice system when they kill their abusers? The article
will answer those questions by engaging a hermeneutic of
inclusive conversation, the theoretical basis of which is discussed
in the following section.
III. A HERMENEUTIC OF INCLUSIVE CONVERSATION: POTTER’S
BOXES
In its narrow frame of reference, hermeneutics is defined as
“the rules one uses for searching out the meaning of writings.”90 In
a broader sense, hermeneutics goes beyond textual interpretation to
88

Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1267-68.
Id. at 1281-82 (observing that imminence operates as a silent retreat rule,
even in states that have rejected retreat). For a discussion of imminence as a
species of retreat, see infra Parts IV.A. & C.
90
WESTMINSTER, supra note 12, at 127; see also Elisabeth Schüssler
Fiorenza, Feminist Hermeneutics, in THE ANCHOR BIBLE DICTIONARY 783, 785
(David Noel Freeman ed., 1992) (advising that the term Ahermeneutics” is
derived from the Greek word hermeneuein / hermeneia, defined as “the practice
and theory of interpretation.”). Distinctions have been traditionally drawn
between general philosophical hermeneutics and critical hermeneutics as well as
between specialized forms of hermeneutics such as legal and theological
hermeneutics. Lategan, supra note 12, at 149-50 (noting that a hermeneutics of
jurisprudence—reflected in modernity as modes of interpreting statutes—arose
out of a revival of interest in Roman Law in the 12th century). More recently,
legal scholars are looking to philosophical hermeneutics to deepen legal
hermeneutical analysis. See, e.g., Ioannis S. Papadopoulos & Mark Tushnet,
Legal Hermeneutics at a Crossroads: Giuseppe Zaccaria’s Questioni di
Interretazione, 8 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 261 (2000) (proposing
Zaccaria’s work as a bridge between American legal thought and philosophical
hermeneutics); Francis J. Mootz III, Review Essay: The New Legal
Hermeneutics, 47 VAND. L. REV. 115 (1994) (reviewing GREGORY LEYH, LEGAL
HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE (1992)).
89
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“refer to one’s means or ways of interpreting and construing the
meaning of experience.”91 Closely related is a hermeneutic, which
is defined as “the lens or perspective or set of assumptions through
which experience is processed, or through which life is ‘read.’”92
Against a backdrop of key legal doctrines, this article uses a
hermeneutic of inclusive conversation to read the experiences of
women who live with and kill abusive male partners. The
methodology is an adaptation of a hermeneutic for moral
deliberation known as “Potter’s Boxes” that was developed by
Harvard social ethicist Ralph B. Potter.93
Potter’s Boxes begin with an inquiry into the adequacy of our
moral discourse.94 According to Potter, to be adequate, a moral
discourse must enable us to speak about the four critical
dimensions of our existence: the natural order, self, society, and
ultimate reality.95 The first dimension, which also corresponds to
91

CHARLES R. FOSTER & THEODORE BRELSFORD, WE ARE THE CHURCH
TOGETHER: CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN CONGREGATIONAL LIFE 166 (1996).
92
Id. at 163.
93
See Potter 1980, supra note 13; see also Ralph B. Potter, Colloquium in
Ethics (Sept. 21, 1989) [hereinafter Potter 1989] (unpublished collection) (on
file with the author); Ralph B. Potter, Qualms of a Believer, 69 SOUNDINGS 111
(1986) [hereinafter Potter 1986]; Ralph B. Potter, Justice and Beyond in Moral
Education, 19 ANDOVER NEWTON Q. 3 (1979) [hereinafter Potter 1979]. This
schema was adapted by Potter from the work of Harvard sociologist Talcott
Parsons, whose social systems theory envisioned the domains of life as
functionally interrelated. Potter 1989, supra. Feminist sociologist Miriam
Johnson offered a feminist reappraisal of the work of Talcott Parsons. Miriam
M. Johnson, Feminism and the Theories of Talcott Parsons, in FEMINISM AND
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 101 (Ruth A. Wallace ed., 1989) (focusing on the “fit”
between feminism and Parsons’ theory of social progress). I have previously
emphasized the multidimensional and interdisciplinary methodology at the heart
of Parsons’ work as bearing fruit for feminist scholarship. Koons, Making
Peace, supra note 13, at 20, n.93.
94
The description of Potter’s Boxes was drawn from Koons, Making
Peace, supra note 13, at 19-22.
95
Potter 1986, supra note 93, at 112-13. These four domains relate to the
four functional prerequisites of Parsons’ social system analysis: adaptation, goal
attainment, integration, and latent pattern maintenance. Potter 1989, supra note
93. Potter translated the Parsonsian functions into moral considerations as
follows:
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the first of four domains of Potter’s Boxes, orients toward the facts
of a situation and relates us to the natural order through empirical
disciplines. Utilitarianism is an example of a moral language that
arises from this quadrant. The second domain centers on loyalties
and imparts a psychological account of self, relationships, and
community. Communitarianism is a representative moral language
from this domain. The third domain highlights norms and
expresses a political philosophy of what is a just society. Moral
languages reflecting this domain are Deontology and Rights-Based
Justice. The fourth domain inquires into meaning and questions the
purpose of life and the terms of our human existence. Illustrative
moral languages located in this domain are from Religious or
Philosophical Traditions.96
To Potter, each domain may be seen as employing a different
moral language that represents one of the four major orientations to
life.97 In Potter’s view, each language is distinctive by virtue of
having “its own logic, criteria of adequacy, prospect of criticism,
and possibility of ‘improvement.’”98
At heart, Potter’s Boxes reject any methodology that would
privilege one of the four moral languages or that would seek to
create another moral “first language” as the vehicle for considering

First, an adequate moral language must relate us to the natural order
through ‘economic’ and ‘ecological’ doctrines. Second, it must provide
a psychological account of how a stable sense of self is created and
maintained. Third, it must yield a political philosophy guiding our
reconstruction of a just and sustainable society. Fourth, it must express
a common sense of what life is about and, ultimately, the terms of our
human existence.
Potter 1986, supra note 93, at 113.
96
Id. Two moral languages which are often considered the foundation of
our Western legal system are Utilitarianism and Deontology. The relational
domain has been the locus of feminist critiques of rights-based justice. E.g.,
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Women’s Conceptions of Self and of
Morality, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 481 (1977).
97
In Qualms of a Believer, Potter presented examples of utilitarian
individualism, expressive individualism, the civic republican tradition, and the
biblical tradition. Potter 1986, supra note 93.
98
Potter 1979, supra note 93, at 147.
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aspects of the common life.99 Potter insisted that a significant
problem of moral adequacy arises when one of these languages is
advanced as a first language, seeking to serve as the basis for
adjudicating all questions of the common life.100 Potter argued that
each perspective is incomplete, by offering a skewed moral
vocabulary and only a partial vision for public discourse.101
In Potter’s understanding, a full moral deliberation necessarily
includes each of the moral languages.102 Each language privileges
certain considerations and also flags areas of concern when those
considerations are offended. Consequently, a full moral
deliberation among interlocutors may include comments such as
the following:
‘You don’t have the facts straight,’ ‘You have failed to take
into account the welfare of certain persons who deserve
consideration,’ ‘You have neglected a variety of relevant
99

Potter 1986, supra note 93, at 114 (critiquing ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL.,
HABITS OF THE HEART (1985) as posing civic republicanism as a moral first
language).
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. Potter’s Boxes may be used in the classroom as the basis for a
critical self-reflective process that also brings stories of people and
considerations of meaning into equal partnership with the facts and norms.
Potter’s Boxes offers a way to talk about and across issues of race, gender, and
class. For example, when discussing racism and white privilege in jurisprudence
classes, I invite students to identify the considerations that they are privileging,
to sharpen or modify their moral commitments, to diagnose the considerations
that are being privileged by others in the conversation, and to assess the factors
that are being overlooked in the conversation. Potter’s Boxes helps some
students to see that they may be privileging a short-term historical perspective
and a norm of individual responsibility, while other students may be taking a
longer-term historical perspective, emphasizing the effect of racism on people,
or probing the structural causes of racism. Potter’s Boxes also has potential for
transforming the law by offering a ground for critiquing hidden norms and
assumptions of the law as well as by encouraging a vision of justice that is
participatory and dialogic. The hermeneutic widens the circle of relevant
considerations and offers a norm of inclusion in which all voices are necessary
for a full conversation, including those traditionally silenced. See, e.g., Koons,
Making Peace, supra note 13 (employing Potter’s Boxes to imagine justice in
terms of inclusive mutuality).
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considerations and given others undue weight,’ or ‘You’ve
taken only a short-term view, or failed to comprehend what
the purpose of our whole enterprise is.’103
Each language not only contributes its distinctive orientation
for organizing and understanding the world, but also serves as a
necessary corrective to the partiality of the others. The
interweaving of languages is essential to the framework of
inclusive conversation and offers a structural assurance of regard
“not only for the form of moral logic employed, but also for one’s
capacity to get the facts straight, to judge whose welfare is at stake,
and to interpret life in some fairly coherent manner.”104
Western jurisprudence, based on Utilitarianism and
Deontology, so often focuses on the facts and the law, neglecting
considerations of relationships and meaning.105 For many legal
scholars, the legitimacy of the legal system is squarely based on
the necessity of judging by neutral principles.106 Despite such
stated formalism, the law silently absorbs social norms into its
“neutral principles.”107 Of moment to this article is the notion that
103

Potter 1979, supra note 93, at 147. To extend Potter’s schema, the four
identified moral languages may be heard to ask: What is Good? What is Fitting?
What is Right? What is True?
104
Id. Addressing the problem of living and moral agency, Alasdair
MacIntyre called for the development of thoughtful moral agency—one that is
able to identify presuppositions and one that is able to reflectively choose how
to live and how to work. Alasdair MacIntyre, The Recovery of Moral Agency?,
HARV. DIV. BULL. 6 (Fall 1999) (The Dudleian Lecture at Harvard Divinity
School, Apr. 16, 1999) (proposing that the knowledge needed for thoughtful
moral agency is not theoretical, but practical).
105
Inattention to stories of clients and considerations of wider meaning
may be seen as leading to the impoverishment of the law. See, e.g., Christopher
Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of
Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 86, 909, 920 (1992)
(proposing that client narratives and the deeper meanings in clients’ struggles
“hold the potential to make judges aware of and acknowledge the perspective of
those excluded, and can empower lawyers with the ability to breathe life into
stale, abstracted legal rules and doctrines.”).
106
E.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles: A
Retrospective, 50 VAND. L. REV. 503 (1997).
107
Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1294, 1298 (inviting recognition
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among the social norms that fill the law with meaning are
pernicious ideas of gender hierarchy.108 Criminal law purports to
be based on neutral principles, but remains full of contested
meanings.109
In the next section, the article constructs a hermeneutic of
inclusive conversation to engage in a gender analysis of domestic
violence and the doctrinal strictures of the criminal justice system.
By centering its analysis in four different domains, the article will
illuminate some of the contradictions that structure the legal claims
of women who live with—and kill—battering men.
IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND THE LIVED REALITY OF
BATTERING: ASSESSING THE FACTS, LOYALTIES, NORMS, AND
MEANINGS
A. The Facts: Intimate Battering of Women
Every fifteen seconds a woman is beaten in the United
States.110 An estimated 1 million to 4.8 million women are

“of the ways in which the law absorbs and constitutes popular norms that it does
not disclose and may even disavow” as well as the ways that criminal law “not
only oppresses openly and in positive law, but quietly and constitutively.”).
108
Victoria F. Nourse, Law’s Constitution: A Relational Critique, 17 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 23, 38-39 (2002) [hereinafter Nourse, Relational] (discussing the
discrimination that is reflected in the rule of imminence, and the social norms
that it absorbs, as “a discrimination of relation, a rule that reenacts a relation of
inferiority and invisibility.”); Judith Lorber, “Night to His Day”: The Social
Construction of Gender, in FEMINIST FRONTIERS 40 (Laurel Richardson et al.
eds, 5th ed. 2001) (describing the social institution of gender in three ways: as a
process of creating social statuses; as a part of a stratification system that
hierarchically ranks men and women; and as a structure that “divides work in
the home and in economic production, legitimates those in authority, and
organizes sexuality and emotional life”).
109
Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1239.
110
Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Christine W. Sigman, Reexamining the Doctrine
of Self-Defense to Accommodate Battered Women, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 169
(1991) [hereinafter Steele & Sigman] (referring to DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
July 16, 1990, at C3).
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assaulted by their intimate partners every year.111 More precise
figures are difficult to adduce because intimate assaults of women
are only reported in one-fourth to one-seventh of all cases.112
However, a number of sources estimate that one-third to one-half
of all American women endure at least one physical assault by a
partner during adulthood,113 and that up to twenty-five percent of
all intimate relationships are marked by violence toward a female
partner.114
111

Andersen & Read-Andersen, supra note 18, at 366 (1992); see also
Incidents of Family Violence: A Special Study 341, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ibrs.htm (reporting data from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program that 3.2 million domestic
violence incidents were reported in 2001); HARBOR HOUSE, NATIONAL
STATISTICS: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IS DAMAGING PHYSICALLY AND
EMOTIONALLY,
available
at
http://www.harborhouseoccadv.com/facts/dvstats.htm (last visited June 29,
2005) [hereinafter Harbor House] (citing National Violence Against Women
Survey, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence (2002)
for a reported annual estimate of 4.5 million physical assaults and 300,000
sexual assaults against U.S. women).
112
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THE
COSTS
OF
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
TO
SOCIETY,
at
http://www.dccadv.org/statistics.htm (last visited June 28, 2005) [hereinafter
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA]; FLORIDA MORTALITY REVIEW PROJECT 3 (1997)
(referring to Governor’s Task Force on Domestic and Sexual Violence for data
that approximately one-seventh of domestic assaults come to the attention of
police); see also HARBOR HOUSE, supra note 111, at 1 (citing National Violence
Against Women Survey (July 2000) for data that one-fourth of physical assaults
against women by intimate partners were reported to police).
113
Jill Smolowe, When Violence Hits Home, TIME, July 4, 1994, at 18
(referring to a 1992 report of the American Medical Association that as many as
one in three women will be assaulted by an intimate partner during their
lifetimes); Mahoney, supra note 17, at 10 nn.40-41 (citing LENORE WALKER,
THE BATTERED WOMEN 19 (1979)) (estimating that half of all women will be
battered at some point in their lives and noting estimates by other researchers
that fifty to seventy percent of women are battered during marriage).
114
Meier, supra note 17, at 1304 n.24 (advising that surveys show between
one-fourth and one-fifth of marital or cohabiting relationships experience at least
one incident of violence); Ann Coker et al., Frequency and Correlates of
Intimate Partner Violence by Type: Physical, Sexual, and Psychological
Battering, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 553 (Apr. 2000) (reporting results of a survey
of 1401 women that 20.2 percent were currently experiencing intimate partner
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“Domestic violence”115 is the major cause of injury to women,
ranking above auto accidents, rapes, and muggings.116 Of the
women who seek treatment in emergency rooms, an estimated
twenty-two to thirty-five percent are treated from injuries related to
ongoing partner abuse.117
Between 2,000 and 4,000 women die each year at the hands of
abusers, many of whom are husbands and boyfriends.118 Thirty
violence and 55.1 percent had experienced intimate partner violence in a current
or past relationship with a male partner).
115
For an overview of critiques of the use of the phrases “domestic
violence,” “spouse abuse,” and “battered women,” see Meier, supra note 17. In
studying intimate partner violence, some sociologists have identified four subtypes: 1) situational couple violence, occurring in a non-controlling relationship;
2) intimate terrorism (also called patriarchal terrorism), motivated by desire by a
partner (usually a man) for general relationship control; 3) violent resistance,
fighting back or acting in self-defense against a violent, controlling partner; and
4) mutual violent control, characterized by violence and control by both
partners. Wood, supra note ±, at 557 (noting that intimate terrorism is “the most
extreme and dangerous kind of intimate violence”).
116
E.g., Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1053 (Fla. 1999) (citing
Governor’s Task Force on Domestic Violence, The First Report 2 (1994));
HARBOR HOUSE, supra note 111, at 1 (referring to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports (1991)).
117
HARBOR HOUSE, supra note 111, at 1 (citing David Adams, Identifying
the Assaultive Husband in Court: You’re the Judge, BOSTON B. J. 33-34 (JulyAug. 1989).
118
Steele & Sigman, supra note 110, at 169 (referring to report of DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, July 16, 1990, at C3 that more than 2,000 women are
murdered by husbands and boyfriends each year); Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1053
(quoting Governor’s Task Force on Domestic Violence, The First Report 3
(1994) that “[o]ver four thousand women die annually at the hands of their
abuser.”).
Men who engage in battering have their own stories to tell—stories of loss and,
perhaps at a deeper level, stories from childhood of having witnessed their
mothers being abused. Michelle Fine, Crime Stories: A Critical Look Through
Race, Ethnicity, and Gender, 11 INT’L J. QUALITATIVE STUDIES IN ED. 435
(1998) (discussing, in a qualitative study of the life histories of residents of lowincome urban communities, the Astories of loss . . . voiced in a discourse of
property rights of white, working class males); Levine, supra note 18, at 63
(reporting that seventy-three percent of men in a study reported having been
physically or sexually abused as children). In a study of men in a batterers’
intervention program that asked how men account for their battering and how
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percent of female murder victims in 1990 were killed by their
husbands or boyfriends, prompting one scholar to describe the
phenomenon as “Intimate Femicide.”119 In Florida, spouses and
cohabitants far outstrip other persons in committing the most
domestic violence offenses.120 In 2004, for example, of 119,772
reported domestic violence offenses in the state, 30,427 were
committed by spouses and 36,289 were committed by
cohabitants.121
Medical expenses of women who are battered by intimate
partners total $3 to $5 billion dollars each year.122 Businesses lose
$100 million in lost wages, sick leave, absenteeism, and nonproductivity.123 An estimated twenty-five percent of workplace
non-productivity arises out of domestic violence.124 Individual
costs of spouse abuse include personal injuries from battery and
their accounts draw on their understandings of manhood, a sociologist identified
“dueling narratives of manhood” in the accounts: a code of male superiority, in
which perceived entitlements justified the exercise of violence and a code of
chivalry, in which an attitude of protectionism was linked to women in the
abstract or to specific women, such as mothers and daughters. Wood, supra note
±, at 571, 573 (also noting that the mission of the program was to help men to
“redefine what it means to be a man.”).
119
The Paladin Group Grant Mentors, Domestic Violence Articles, 2,
available at http://www.silcom.com/~paladin/madv/stats2.html (last visited June
29, 2005) [hereinafter Paladin] (referring to study by Karen Stout, Intimate
Femicide: A National Demographic Overview, 1 VIOLENCE UPDATE 3 (Feb.
1991)).
120
FLORIDA DEP’T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, STATEWIDE TRACKING OF
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
CASES,
at
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/FSAC/Publications/dv-jan98.asp (recommending that
a Domestic Violence Data Resource Center be established within the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement).
121
For the 119,772 domestic violence crimes reported in 2004, the
relationship of victim to offender was as follows: 30,427 (spouse), 11,670
(parent), 9,361 (sibling), 9,213 (child), 7,978 (other family), 36,289 (cohabitant),
14,834 (other). Id. (citing Florida Statistical Analysis Center, Crime in Florida,
Florida Uniform Crime Report (1992-2004)). Of the 119,772 crimes reported,
arrests were made in 64,072 cases. Id.
122
Paladin, supra note 119 (citing COLORADO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
COALITION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS (3d ed. 1991)).
123
Id.
124
Id. (citing data from Minnesota Employee Assistance Providers).
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psychological injury from intentional infliction of emotional
distress.125 Some women who have sought shelter have reported
that the abusers have destroyed an estimated $10,000 of family
property prior to separation.126 Moving expenses for a woman who
is battered—when those funds are available—may cost another
$5,000.127
The drastic impact on women of a retreat rule for cohabitants is
apparent when considering the pervasiveness of battering of
women by husbands in the home. For example, every nine
seconds, a husband physically abuses his wife in the United
States.128 Women are abused in an estimated twelve percent of all
marriages.129
Physical violence is simply one aspect of the injury suffered by
women who are battered. Domestic violence, as experienced by
many women,130 is a continuing pattern of behavior that includes
125

Ann Campbell White, What You Didn’t Learn in Law School: Family
Law and Domestic Violence, 68 FLA. B. J. 38, 40 (Oct. 1994).
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1054 (Fla. 1999) (citing Executive
Office of the Governor, The Governor’s Task Force on Domestic and Sexual
Violence, The Third Report, vii (March 31, 1997)).
129
Id. (citing Joan H. Krause, Of Merciful Justice and Justified Mercy:
Commuting the Sentences of Battered Women Who Kill, 46 FLA. L. REV. 699,
702 (1994)).
130
In evaluating commonalities in perceived patterns of battering, I am not
arguing that the experiences of women who live with battering men are the
same. E.g., Koons, Making Peace, supra note 13, at 64-65 (discussing
difference, sameness, commonality, and connection in proposing a model of
inclusive mutuality as a praxis for justice). Experiences of battering carry with
them enormous complexity and variety. E.g., Christina Nicolaidis et al., Could
We Have Known? A Qualitative Analysis of Data From Women Who Have
Survived an Attempted Homicide by an Intimate Partner, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL
MEDICINE 788, 792 (Oct. 2003). In seeking to avoid the perils of essentialism, I
also situate the article within the theoretical frame of “the personal is political.”
Pepi Leistyna et al., Glossary, in BREAKING FREE: THE TRANSFORMATIVE
POWER OF CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 336-37 (Pepi Leistyna et al. eds., 1996)
(defining essentialism as an orientation that “ascribes a fundamental nature or
biological determinism to humans . . . .Within this monolithic and homogenizing
view, categories such as race and gender become gross generalizations, and
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physical and non-physical manifestations of power and control.131
Yet, the law often focuses on discrete incidents of physical
violence—the “number of hits”—not the “continuum of sexual and
verbal abuse, threats, economic coercion, stalking, and social
isolation” that is the experiential nature of domestic violence.132
Some women who have been battered by their male partners
describe the non-physical abuse, including humiliation and
psychological degradation, as particularly painful.133 A man who
single-cause explanations about individual character.”); see also Fine, supra
note 118, at 5 (“While we refuse essentialisms of race and gender, and must
recognize enormous individual variation within groups, we also need to
emphasize that the intersectionalities of race, gender, and class lead to important
questions and generalizations” about violence in communities). “The personal is
political,” as received wisdom of the women’s movement, continues to have
vitality in challenging the deadly belief that experiences, such as battering, are
too unique or personal to be discussed in public and, being sequestered in the
private realm, are not deserving of political attention or resolution. IRIS MARION
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 120-21 (1990) (explaining
that the slogan “expresses the principle that no social practices or activities
should be excluded as improper subjects for public discussion, expression, or
collective choice.”).
131
Battering is “the establishment of control and fear in a relationship
through violence and other forms of abuse. The batterer uses acts of violence
and a series of behaviors, including intimidation, threats, psychological abuse,
[and] isolation . . . to coerce and control the other person.” OREGON
COMMISSION AGAINST DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
MYTHS AND FACTS, at http://www.ocadsv.com/myths.htm (citing Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports (1990); see also Deborah
Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 961 (2004)
[hereinafter Tuerkheimer] (characterizing domestic violence as “an ongoing
pattern of behavior defined by both physical and non-physical manifestations of
power.”).
132
SCHNEIDER, LAWMAKING, supra note 17, at 65; Tuerkheimer, supra
note 131, at 963-65 (asserting that power and control are at the heart of
battering, “[y]et the boundaries of criminal law have remained largely
impermeable” to an accurate and accepted understanding of battering).
133
Charles Patrick Ewing, Psychological Self-Defense, 14 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 579, 587 (1990) (arguing for the permissible use of deadly force to
prevent serious psychological injury). In State v. Norman, the intermediate
appellate court recounted the following facts as part of the non-physical trauma
that Ms. Norman experienced the day before killing her husband while he slept:
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batters often exercises domination by making rules that his partner
must follow, such as dictating with whom she may talk, monitoring
phone conversations, identifying what clothes she may wear,
denoting how household chores must be done, keeping her from
reading materials or ideas that he does not like, requiring her to
ask permission to leave the room or take a bath, forcing her to stay
awake, and requiring her to engage in demeaning activities like
kneeling or begging for money.134 A man who batters may also
establish forms of abuse as enforcement mechanisms for violations
of rules.135 Rule-making and punishing eventually give way to “a
“[John] Norman asked [Judy Norman] to make him a sandwich; when [Judy]
brought it to him, he threw it on the floor and told her to make him another.
[Judy] made him a second sandwich and brought it to him; [John] again threw it
on the floor, telling her to put something on her hands because he did not want
her to touch the bread. [Judy] made a third sandwich using a paper towel to
handle the bread. [John] took the third sandwich and smeared it in [Judy’s]
face.” State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586, 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), rev’d 378
S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (also noting that, in the thirty-six hours prior to his death,
he forced her to commit prostitution to make money, made threats to cut off her
breast “and shove it up her rear end,” made a number of threats to kill family
members, interfered with emergency medical personnel who were trying to
revive her from an overdose of pills (saying, “Let the bitch die . . . . She ain’t
nothing but a dog. She don’t deserve to live.”), and repeatedly physically
assaulted her in a number of ways).
134
Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation
in Domestic Violence Cases, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 2117, 2126 (1992-1993) (citing
the following examples of rules made by a battering husband: “that no one
(including guests and their toddler children) wear shoes in the house, that the
furniture be in the same indentations in the carpet, that the vacuum marks in the
carpet be parallel, that any sand that spilled from the children’s sandbox during
their play be removed from the surrounding grass.”). Any real or imagined
infraction of these kind of rules often resulted in a beating or the expression of
irritation that was a prelude to a beating. Id. Four rules are cited as most
important to men who batter: “1. You cannot leave this relationship unless I am
through with you. 2. You may not tell anyone about my violence or coercive
controls. 3. I am entitled to your obedience, service, affection, loyalty, fidelity,
and undivided attention. 4. I get to decide which of the other rules are critical.”
Barbara J. Hart, Rule Making and Enforcement / Rule Compliance and
Resistance, in I AM NOT YOUR VICTIM 259 (Bethel Sipe & Evelyn J. Hall eds.,
1996).
135
Fischer, supra note 134, at 2131.
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general climate of increasingly subtle control, where the batterer
needs to do less and less to structure his family’s behavior.”136
In many cases, keys to the enforcement mechanisms for rule
violations are fear, emotional abuse, and social isolation.137 To
control a partner by fear, a man who batters may use a symbol, a
look, or a gesture associated with abuse to signal the threat of
violence.138 Men who batter may also use “mental games” to
control women.139 One man explained that after he had hit his
girlfriend once, “I never hit her again ever. I was more mental.”140
Mental and emotional abuse can be just as devastating as physical
abuse. According to one survivor:
He always found something wrong with what I did, even if
I did what he asked. No matter what it was. It was never the
way he wanted it. I was either too fat, didn’t cook the food
right . . . .I think he wanted to hurt me. To hurt me in the
sense . . . to make me feel like I was a nothing.141
Battering, as experienced by many women, is distorted when
read through doctrines such as imminence.142 In the context of the
136

Id. at 2129.
Id. at 2131-32.
138
Id. at 2120, 2126.
139
Wood, supra note ±, at 561-62 (articulating seven themes in a study of
twenty-two incarcerated men who had volunteered for a batterers’ intervention
program, including justifications (“A man has a right to control his woman.”),
dissociations (“My violence was limited.”), and remorse (“I regret that I abused
her.”)).
140
Id. at 566 (noting that men who engaged in battering defined their
violence as limited by pointing out the limits that they observed, such as not
hitting a partner when she was pregnant).
141
Fischer, supra note 134, at 2117 (quoting the text of an interview of one
of eighty-three women seeking court protection from battering partners in Karla
Fisher, The Psychological Impact and Meaning of Court Orders of Protection for
Battered Women (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois
(Urbana-Champaign)).
142
In the law of self-defense, a force is imminent “if it will occur
‘immediately’ or ‘at once.’ The danger must be ‘pressing and urgent.’ Force is
not imminent if an aggressor threatens to harm another person at a later time.”
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 28, at 229; see also Mahoney, supra
note 17, at 84 (arguing that decisions that construe imminence “as virtually
137
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killing of a battering man by a woman, imminence is a confused
doctrine.143 While it purports to be based simply on the passage of
time, imminence actually reflects subjective social norms, such as
that a woman who lives with a battering man “should have left”
the room, the house, or the relationship.144 Infused with
suppositions about gender roles and behavior, imminence often
functions as a retreat rule to enforce unspoken societal assumptions
that women should leave battering relationships before episodes of
violence take place.145 Yet, requiring retreat, in whatever form,
exposes women to greater danger of abuse.146
The unworkability of a retreat rule is manifest when
considering the phenomenon of separation assault. Legal scholars
have defined separation assault as “the attack on the woman’s body
and volition in which her partner keeps her from leaving, retaliates
for the separation, or forces her to return.”147 The concept of
separation assault recognizes that patterns of violence, already
dramatic, often increase upon a woman’s separation from a
equivalent to immediacy place significant limits on the ability of women to raise
claims that they acted in self-defense.”).
143
“If imminence serves as a proxy for other self-defense factors—
questions of motive and emotion and retreat—then scholars of self-defense
should be worried not only that imminence is sloppy but also that, as applied,
imminence invites doctrinal confusion.” Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at
1260.
144
Id. at 1281-83; see also Nourse, Relational, supra note 108, at 36-38
(illustrating how time absorbs social norms (i.e., she should have left)).
145
Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1281-85 (also noting the
incongruity of requiring a woman to leave before a confrontation occurs).
146
Melissa Wheatcroft, Note, Duty to Retreat for Cohabitants—In New
Jersey A Battered Spouse’s Home is Not Her Castle, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 566
(1999) (arguing that “[a] safe retreat for the battered spouse is often an
impossibility.”); see also U.S. v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(outlining general principles of self-defense and observing: “The doctrine of
retreat was never intended to enhance the risk to the innocent; its proper
application has never required a faultless victim to increase his assailant’s safety
at the expense of his own.”). For discussion of states observing the cohabitant
exception to the castle doctrine, see supra note 53.
147
Separation assault (an attack on the separation) “is an attempt to gain,
retain, or regain power in a relationship, or to punish the woman for ending the
relationship. It often takes place over time.” Mahoney, supra note 17, at 65-66.
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battering man.148 According to the Department of Justice, seventyfive percent of assaults occur when the abused party is divorced or
separated from the abuser.149 Another study indicates that fortyfive percent of murders of women arise out of a man’s “rage over
the actual or impending estrangement from his partner.”150 Women
who are separated from their spouses are three times more likely to
be attacked than divorced women and twenty-five times more
likely to be attacked than married women.151
Even a limited retreat rule, as had been carved out by the
Florida Supreme Court, places women at increased risk of
violence. It is at the moment of separation—the first physical move
toward separation—that a battering man is prone to become more
violent.152 A decision —or even a threat—to leave can trigger
lethal violence.153 Because domestic violence is marked by power
and control, attempting to exit a room may be considered
“disobedience,” spurring escalated violence.154 Resistance
148

Id. at 5-6.
Linda Dakis, Injunctions for Protection, 68 FLA. BAR J. 48, 50 (Oct.
1994) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L REPORT ON CRIME AND JUSTICE
(1983)); see also Bachman & Saltzman, supra note 4, at 1, 4 (reporting that
women separated from husbands were victimized at a rate three times higher
than women who were divorced and twenty-five times higher than women who
were married).
150
Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1053 (Fla. 1999) (quoting a study in
DONALD G. DUTTON, THE BATTERER: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE 15 (1995)).
151
Bachman & Saltzman, supra note 4, at 2.
152
Mahoney, supra note 17, at 5-6. A study of thirty women who survived
attempted femicide found that, in the majority of cases, the attack took place as
the woman was trying to leave the relationship. Nicolaidis, supra note 130, at
731. See also Deborah J. Anderson, The Impact of Subsequent Violence on
Returning to an Abusive Partner, 34 J. COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUD. 93 (2003)
(demonstrating that victims of domestic violence who temporarily leave an
abusive relationship experience an average of eight more violent incidents per
year than victims who stay).
153
Mahoney, supra note 17, at 5-6 (discussing separation assault where a
decision to leave triggers an attack).
154
Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 963 (noting the ubiquity of a “power
and control” dynamic in the lives of women who live with battering men). See
also Hart, supra note 134, at 259 (advising that many men who commit intimate
battery create a hierarchy of rule and enforcement measures for disobedience of
149
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strategies (such as leaving a room) may force an abuser “to make
his coercive power explicit. Any threat, however small, to the
abuser’s authority within the family is likely to be met with
violence.”155 According to one woman, “The best way to avoid
[battering] was to show as little reaction as possible . . . . I didn’t
dare argue with him or challenge him—for fear of my life
actually.”156 Trying to exit past a raging man may be the final
move of a woman seeking only to avoid violence.157 Killing a
battering man may be the safest available alternative.158
B. The Loyalties: The Relational Context of Battering of
Women
The second movement of the hermeneutic invites consideration
of relationships.
Yet, the language of law—individuality,
neutrality, and abstraction—blocks us from talking about values,
relationships, and structural injustice.159 Because legal language is
unable to express the “complex relationship between power,
gender, and knowledge” and because the framework of battering
inexorably links power, control, and violence, the law does not
apprehend the experience of many women who live with battering
men.160
the rules).
155
Fischer, supra note 134, at 2133.
156
Id. at 2130 n.69 (quoting a participant in a study by LIZ KELLY,
SURVIVING SEXUAL VIOLENCE 180 (1988)).
157
Nicolaidis, supra note 130, at 791, 793 (finding, in a study of survivors
of attempted femicide, that nearly half of the victims were surprised by the
attacks and were trying the leave relationships for reasons other than violence);
see also Levine, supra note 18, at 63 (noting that seventy-three percent of men
in a study reported having been physically or sexually abused as children).
158
Evan Stark, Rethinking Homicide: Violence, Race, and the Politics of
Gender, 20 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVICES 18 (1990) (proposing that killing may be
the safest alternative due to the absence or ineffectiveness of police protection).
159
Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of
the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 896
(1989) (also identifying the language of neutrality as a device for silencing
women).
160
Id.; Mahoney, supra note 17, at 5 (pointing to power and control as “the
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Objectivity, conflict, legal status, and atomized events form the
terrain of the law.161 However, relationship forms the terrain of the
system of domination of many men who engage in battering.162
The relational context of a battering relationship has been
characterized by three elements: a systematic pattern of domination
and control; abuse (physical, emotional, sexual, familial, or
property); and denying, hiding, or minimizing the abuse.163
Relationally, the dynamics of battering are much like that of
hostage-taking.164 One survivor of battering put it like this:
I just couldn’t take all this . . . Panicked and caged, and not
being able to go anywhere and do anything. It was like he
was an animal trainer, coming in and beating on the bars of
the cage with a stick—only he was outside the bars so he
couldn’t get hurt.165
Unlike the admiration expressed for male hostages who resist
captors in wartime, a woman who resists her captor is not
acclaimed, socially or legally, when that captor is a battering male
partner.166
heart of the battering process.”); Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 966, 978
(arguing that the law fails to hear and provide justice for women in battering
relationships).
161
Finley, supra note 159, at 899 (recognizing law as a language of
conflict); Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 962-63 (arguing that “[p]aradigmatic
crimes are ‘‘transaction-bound.’”).
162
Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 973; Fischer, supra note 134, at 2119,
2141, 2172.
163
Fischer, supra note 134, at 2141.
164
Mahoney, supra note 17, at 87-88 (noting cases that make “a persuasive
analogy” between women who are battered and prisoners of war). A finding of
imminence should not be precluded where a hostage grabs a gun and kills a
guard who has fallen asleep. Id. at 87 (citing State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 584
(Kan. 1988) (Herd, J., dissenting)).
165
Fischer, supra note 134, at 2132 (quoting survivor of battering in JEAN
GILES-SIMS, WIFE BATTERING: A SYSTEMS THEORY 114 (1983)).
166
“The common law’s overt judgment that a woman who kills her
husband is fully traitorous, and a man who kills to defend his marriage is partly
patriot, remains two hundred years later.” Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at
1293-94; see also HERMAN, supra note 18, at 74 (commenting that “[p]olitical
captivity is generally recognized, whereas domestic captivity is often unseen.”).
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The law may be seen as structurally disabled from hearing and
responding to the relational dynamics that are often at the heart of
battering of women by intimate partners.167 For example, the law is
structured around the statutory definition of criminal homicide and
applicable defenses.168 All of the parties are required to focus on
whether the facts meet the elements of the offense, which is
structured in terms of discrete events.169 The law may preclude
witnesses from disclosing in court a contextualized story of
battering, and instead authorize women who have killed their
battering partners to tell only “mangled,” decontextualized stories
of discrete incidents of physical violence.170 Consequently, there is
often a fundamental structural disconnect between incident-based
legal doctrine and a woman’s experiences of living with a battering
partner.171
Relation may be seen as the framework not only for patterns of
167

Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 1030 (arguing against abandoning
criminal law, despite its failure to recognize and remedy harms to women);
Finley, supra note 159, at 906-07 (asserting that, despite the dilemma of legal
language, we cannot disengage from the law or legal discourse). Cf. GORDON
KAUFMAN, IN FACE OF MYSTERY: A CONSTRUCTIVE THEOLOGY 51-52 (1993)
(proposing that, as a worldview cracks, “we need a new faith, that is, a new
frame of orientation, if we are to go on. Such a new frame is never simply spun
out of thin air. It is always the product of rebuilding, transforming, reshaping the
old categories . . . This is a precarious and dangerous project, repairing and
rebuilding the very boat which keeps us afloat.”).
168
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 28, at 221, 540 (outlining
elements of homicide and self-defense); Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 977
(framing the content of a prosecutor’s interview of a victim of battering by the
statutory definition of assault).
169
Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 976-80 (critiquing the incident-based
structure of the criminal law that inattends the continuum of battering).
170
Id. at 989-98 (noting the antipathy with which law views prior-act
character evidence). But see Maguigan, supra note 18, at 383 (concluding from
a survey of appellate opinions that legal doctrine does not exclude consideration
of social context); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CRIMINAL LAW 532 (3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter DRESSLER, CRIMINAL] (noting the
clear judicial trend to admit battered woman syndrome evidence in cases of
confrontational homicide, which explicitly requires evidence of a history of
abuse).
171
Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 992.
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battering but also for a variety of choices made by many women
who live with battering men. As rational actors, women who are
battered often employ a host of strategies to attempt to stop the
abuse.172 In one study, women tried an average of thirteen different
strategies each, including talking to the abuser, consulting with
friends and family, calling the police, leaving the abuser, and
trying to obtain counseling and legal assistance.173
Strategies engaged by women who live with battering men are
often embedded in complex interpersonal and communal
relationships.174 A woman’s relationship with an abusive partner
may be marked by love and commitment. Explained one woman:
[M]y husband is an alcoholic. Things have been really bad
these past few years. But we’ve been married thirteen
years. And I have three children. For nine of those years, he
was the best husband and father anyone could have asked
for. The way I look at it, he has a disease. I know that when
he’s not drinking, he’s not like this. I may have to leave.
But if I do, I’m not giving up on a father for the children,
and I’m not giving up on him. And I can’t just throw away
those nine years.175
Women with children may make decisions on the basis of
172

Fischer, supra note 134, at 2135-36 (discussing a study of women who
obtained protective orders and thirty-one strategies they had employed to stop
the violence).
173
Id; see also People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (1996) (recounting the
strategies employed to stop the abuse, such as “hiding, running away,
counterviolence, seeking the help of friends and family, going to a shelter, and
contacting police.”).
174
Mahoney, supra note 17, at 20.
175
Id. at 21; Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, A.K.A., Why Abuse
Victims Stay, 28-OCT COLO. LAW. 19, 21, 23 (1999) (listing fifty obstacles to
leaving an abuser and noting, under “Excuses,” that “[d]omestic violence is not
caused by stress or substance abuse, although it can exacerbate the problem”
and, under “Love,” that a “victim may say [she] still loves the perpetrator,
although she definitely wants to violence to stop.”); see also Nan Seuffert,
Critique and Comment: Domestic Violence, Discourses of Romantic Love, and
Complex Personhood in the Law, 23 MELBOURNE U. L.R. 211, 212 (1999)
(suggesting that some feminists may be uncomfortable with the assertion by
some women that they love men who abuse them).

KOONS MACROED 07-30-06.DOC

INTIMATE BATTERY AND THE LAW

7/30/2006 12:34 PM

663

“extended, collective, multiple self-interest.”176 Mothers may
conclude that their children are best served by remaining in
relationships with the children’s fathers.177 It may be “safer to
stay” with a man who is abusive, keeping a eye on him so that a
woman may protect herself and her children.178
Economic considerations may drive the choices of women who
live with battering men. Financial despair is the number one reason
that women return to men who batter.179 Among the forms of abuse
engaged by some men is financial abuse, in which women are
deprived of money, access to accounts and financial records, and
participation in financial decision-making.180 When a woman
leaves a man who batters, she may quickly be confronted with the
impossibility of providing for herself and her children.181 If a
woman is eligible for welfare, the amount received will be
woefully inadequate to support herself and her children.182 Where a
176

Mahoney, supra note 17, at 19.
Buel, supra note 175, at 20 (advising that some mothers believe that
having two parents in a home is in a child’s best interests, particularly where the
abuser does not assault the child, but that the women and other parties in the
criminal justice system may not be aware of the harm to children of witnessing
domestic violence). Male children who witness domestic violence “are many
times more likely to batter their spouses.” Levine, supra note 18, at 63 (referring
to ANN JONES, NEXT TIME SHE’LL BE DEAD 84 (1994)). Furthermore, “[a] child
who witnessed domestic violence is more likely to grow into a perpetrator or
victim of domestic violence than a child who was himself or herself abused.” Id.
(citing G.T. Hotaling & D.B. Sugarman, An Analysis of Risk Markers in
Husband to Wife Violence: The Current State of Knowledge, 1 VIOLENCE &
VICTIMS 101 (1986)).
178
Buel, supra note 175, at 25 (noting that, where an abuser has previously
stalked and threatened her, a woman is very aware that the abuser is capable of
finding her and the children if she tries to move away).
179
Id. at 21 (referring to a Texas study that found that eighty-five percent
of women who called hotlines, emergency rooms, and shelters had left abusers
“a minimum of five times previously, with the number one reason cited for
returning to the batterer being financial despair.”).
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
The primary safety net for women who are fleeing battering men is
welfare (now called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families). Id. Assuming
eligibility, most states pay less than $400 a month for a household of three. Id.
177
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woman is employed, an abusive man may harass or terrorize her at
work, long after she has separated from him. Moreover, a woman’s
wages may not provide her enough to make ends meet.183 One
survivor who later became a lawyer and a law professor explained:
I’m a single Mom, without child support and trying to go to
night school and keep my job. But with minimum wage, I
can’t seem to pay both day care and the rent, so sometimes
I think about going back, just to make sure my son has
enough to eat. It hurts more to watch him eat macaroni with
ketchup for the third night, than it ever did to get beaten.184
Consequently, a woman who contemplates the economics of
leaving a battering relationship may balance harm to children
through inadequate subsistence with the harm from maintaining the

While welfare is an important tool for combating domestic violence, its
usefulness has been undermined by measures that tie women into continuing
contact with abusive men. Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension
of Contemporary Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
121, 139-40, 166 (2002); see also Joanna Alexandra Norland, When the Vow
Breaks: Why the History of French Divorce Law Sounds a Warning about the
Implications for Women of the Contemporary Marriage Movement, 17 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 321, 339, 342-43 (2002) (drawing on the historical precedent of
France, circa 1792 to 1816, to suggest that the “contemporary Marriage
Movement is intertwined with a political backlash against the rights of women,”
and that what is being jeopardized in the pro-marriage campaign is “women’s
safety and dignity, as well as their ability to protect themselves and their
children from domestic violence.”); Koons, Motherhood, supra note 5 (engaging
a 500-year retrospective on key concepts in welfare reform to critique the
marriage incentives of welfare reauthorization).
183
In a survey of 379 work-reliant and welfare-reliant single mothers in
four cities in the United States, sociologists Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein found
that none of the 165 wage laborers in the survey was able to meet her expenses
with income earned from employment. KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING
ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE
WORK 107 (1997). Earning an average of below $800 per month in employment
income, low-income mothers in the labor force experienced a shortfall that
ranged from $295 to $530 per month, depending on their housing. Id. The 214
women who were reliant on welfare experienced a shortfall that averaged $189
to $519 per month. Id. at 4.
184
Buel, supra note 175, at 19 (quoting the author’s journal, 1977).
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relationship.185 If children are not directly threatened, a woman
may choose subsistence for them rather than safety for herself.186
Race-based concerns may also guide decision-making because
a woman may worry about how the police will treat a man of
color.187 Some women of color have reported the experience of
being forced to choose between gender and race in deciding
whether to contact the criminal justice system.188 In those
circumstances, some women of color have also reported “siding
with race” because “the white-controlled criminal justice system
has not attempted to address the race-based inequities reflected in
the disproportionate number of men of color arrested, prosecuted,
and incarcerated.”189 Furthermore, some critics have observed that
185

Mahoney, supra note 17, at 23.
Buel, supra note 175, at 19-20 (suggesting that mothers may be unaware
of the impact on children of witnessing domestic violence, even if the children
were not directly assaulted).
187
Id. at 20 (stating that a woman may be more concerned about police
treatment of a man of color than about her own safety).
188
Id.
189
Id. The codification of the castle doctrine not only exposes gender
inequities, but also racial injustice, particularly when considering the role of
mistake in justifiable homicide. Many jurisdictions have adopted the principle of
“imperfect self-defense” in which an honest but unreasonable actor stands
convicted of manslaughter rather than murder. E.g., GARDNER & SINGER, supra
note 22, at 1068. Expanding the concept of imperfect self-defense, the Model
Penal Code makes the test of justification the actor’s belief in the necessity for
using force. Model Penal Code ‘ 3.09 cmt. at 150 (1985). Consequently, where a
defendant is mistaken as to the need to use force (as where the aggressor was
reaching for his handkerchief), the doctrine of imperfect self-defense embodies a
willingness of the criminal justice system to recognize the circumstances under
which a defendant may have been required to make split-second decisions.
GARDNER & SINGER, supra note 22, at 1068. Due to the phenomenon of
unconscious racism, the statutory castle doctrine, when combined with the role
of mistake in self-defense, operates to place people of color at greater risk of
deadly assault. E.g., Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987) (noting that much of the behavior
that produces racial discrimination arises from cultural belief systems and is
influenced by unconscious racial motivation). The Implicit Association Test has
been developed by psychologists at Harvard and other institutions to measure
implicit (or unconscious) attitudes about age, gender, race, presidents, sexuality,
Arab-Muslims, weight, religion, disability, Native Americans, Asian-Americans,
186
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many shelters and intervention programs do not reflect the racial
and cultural diversity of people who are served.190
When considering relational issues on a broader scale, some
communities have failed not only to protect many women but also
to provide needed resources. 191 A woman may not be able to leave
a battering man because there is no place to go.192 Affordable
housing is simply not available to meet the needs of poor women
and children.193 Studies demonstrate that approximately fifty
percent of homeless women with children are fleeing violent
men.194 Women who leave battering relationships often
immediately encounter a paucity of resources. Shelters are
generally unable to fill the huge demand for services.195 Moreover,
weapons,
and
skin-tone.
See
Project
Implicit,
at
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit (last visited May 4, 2005); see also Anthony
G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition:
The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL.
1464, 1464-65 (1998) (defining implicit attitudes as “actions or judgments that
are under the control of automatically activated evaluation, without the
performer’s awareness of that causation” and proposing that the implicit
association method may reveal attitudes (including racial attitudes) of which the
subjects may be unaware); see also Robert D. McFadden, U.S. Examining
Killing of Man in Police Volley, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1999, at A1 (reporting the
controversy surrounding the death of Amadou Diallo, an unarmed West African
street peddler, who was shot in a barrage of forty-one bullets by four white
police officers who thought he had a gun, when he was reaching for his wallet).
190
Buel, supra note 175, at 20 (recognizing greater use and success of
services that are race- and culture-specific).
191
Meier, supra note 17, at 1309.
192
Buel, supra note 175, at 24 (asserting “the bleak reality that affordable
housing is at a premium in virtually every community in this country, including
our Tribal Nations.”).
193
Beverly Balos, A Man’s Home is His Castle: How the Law Shelters
Domestic Violence and Sexual Harassment, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 77, 99
(2004) (noting the paradox of the denial of a fundamental right to housing and
the cultural significance of “home” as a “man’s castle,” but only for those who
can afford it).
194
Meier, supra note 17, at 1311 n.52.
195
Mahoney, supra note 17, at 62; see also Katherine M. Culliton, Legal
Remedies for Domestic Violence in Chile and the United States: Cultural
Relativism, Myths, and Realities, 94 CASE WESTERN RESERVE J. INT’L L. 183
(1994) (debunking myth that violence against women is more prevalent in Latin
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shelters may make referrals to social service agencies that do not
have resources to meet basic needs for income, food, clothing,
child care, health care, job training, and transportation.196 One
study concluded that women may leave abusive relationships and
seek help from formal and informal sources, only to discover “that
it was the helping professions, rather than battered women, that
were afflicted with ‘helplessness.’”197
Women who kill battering men also enter into a significant
relationship with the state.198 The state provides the structure,
process, substantive rules, counsel, timing, cultural meaning, range
of permissible outcomes, and institutional punishment for women
claiming self-defense. Critics of the state’s role in the tragic
dynamic have cited the tendency of the criminal justice system to
blame women for abuse and to deny or trivialize the violence.199
America than in the United States by noting one million women are turned away
each year in the United States because shelters are full). There are 1,500 battered
women’s shelters in the United States and 3,800 animal shelters. Paladin, supra
note 122, at 1-2 (also reciting that the first women’s shelter, Women’s
Advocates, opened in St. Paul, Minnesota, in 1974).
196
Mahoney, supra note 17, at 62.
197
Id. at 61. “Mary,” a survivor of battering, related the story of losing
custody of her four-year old son to Russ, her abusive husband: “Attorney # 3
sent me to a psychologist whose attitude reminded me of Lawyer #1. This
psychologist, a woman, said ‘‘we’ll get him,’ referring to Russ’s psychologist.
That is, the . . . key was for her to ‘win’; she did not focus on the safety or wellbeing of my children and me. . . . . She was so self-absorbed. I can still picture
her tossing her hair flirtaciously as she made remarks that destroyed me and my
children.” Kathleen Waits, Battered Women and Their Children: Lessons From
One Woman’s Story, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 29, 53, 55-56 (1998) (also characterizing
the lawyers and psychologists as “very self-promoting and egotistical. It seemed
as if everyone was having a good time, playing the game of litigation and
psychology. All the while, my life was on the line. My children and I did not
matter. I also felt like the lawyers and psychologists were running a cash register
business at my expense. They were a lot more interested in my money than my
welfare. The first two years of my divorce proceedings cost me more than
twenty-five thousand dollars.”).
198
Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1275 (explaining that there are two
different relationships that are implicated in every criminal law defense—”the
relationship between the defendant and the victim and the relationship between
the victim and the state.”).
199
Appearing before a judge to obtain an order of protection, “Mary”
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One judge acknowledged “tremendous gaps” in our justice system
in which the “court system has persistently overlooked domestic
violence in noncriminal and criminal cases.”200 Few women report
incidents of violence because many think that “the police would
not or could not do anything for them.”201
When women do take the step of killing abusers, in many cases
the deaths take place during assaults.202 To survivors of attempted
intimate femicide, it may seem that the state’s response not only
requires them to fit their stories into discordant legal doctrines such
as de jure and de facto retreat rules, but also gives them longer
prison sentences than men who kill their partners.203
recounted: “The judge said, in a dismissive way, ‘It’s been a year and a half
since he last beat you. Is last week’s threat really serious?’” Waits, supra note
197, at 45, 56 (also advising that the judge who heard the custody case had an
outstanding protective order issued against him by his former wife). Referring to
the “ideology that protects the institution of marriage and the state’s
participation in subordinating women,” Mahoney noted obscurantism at two
levels—the obscuring of the self-interest of a man to act violently at the
individual level and the masking of male domination underlying violence
against women at the state level. Mahoney, supra note 17, at 12-13 (citing James
Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE
ABUSE 155 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds., 1988)); see also Maguigan,
supra note 18, at 386-87 (arguing, due to a reversal rate of forty percent in
homicide cases defended by women who were battered and an average reversal
rate of 8.5 percent, that trial courts were not correctly applying long-standing
principles of self-defense to prosecutions of women who kill abusive men).
200
Judge Lynn Tepper, The Court’s Role in Ending Family Violence, 68
FLA. BAR. J. 30, 31 (1994).
201
HARBOR HOUSE, supra note 111, at 1 (referring to the National Violence
Against Women Survey (July 2000) for data that one-fourth of physical assaults
against women by intimate partners were reported to police); see also Paladin,
supra note 122, at 5 (reporting that police were more likely to respond within
five minutes if the offender were a stranger than if an offender were known to
the woman who was battered and citing a Department of Justice survey, Ronet
Bachman, Violence Against Women: A National Crime Victimization Survey
Report 9 (Jan. 1994)).
202
Maguigan, supra note 18, at 384 (advising that “over seventy percent of
all battered women who kill do so when faced with either an ongoing attack or
the imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury” and that the figure may be
closer to ninety percent).
203
The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence and the Pace
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To understand the apparent disparity in these prison sentences
as something other than a disturbing anomaly requires an
understanding of the way that the law is constituted. From a
constitutive perspective, the state reads relational social norms into
the law.204 The norms instantiate a quiet and deadly gender
hierarchy that is disclaimed by other stated legal norms.205 Yet, the
gender hierarchy is pervasive.206 The prison sentences of women
University Battered Women’s Justice Center estimate that women who kill an
intimate partner receive sentences of fifteen to twenty years while men who kill
intimate partners receive sentences of two to six years. Developments, supra
note 31, at 1574 n.3 (referring to Michael Dowd, Director, Pace University
Battered Women’s Justice Center); Wendy Keller, Disparate Treatment of
Spouse Murder Defendants, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 255, 284 n.3
(1996) (also referring to estimates by the National Coalition Against Domestic
Violence). Two reports from the Department of Justice indicated that women
faced shorter sentences for killing a spouse. Id. at 258-59 (citing Patrick A.
Langan & John M. Dawson, Spouse Murder Defendants in Large Urban
Counties (1995) and Bureau of Justice Statistics, Violence Between Intimates
(1994)). Those studies, which do not appear on the list of Bureau of Justice
Statistics publications from 2005 to 1994, have been criticized as failing to
account for legally relevant variables, such as level of severity of crime, prior
criminal records, and lack of provocation. Id.at 259; see VICTIM
CHARACTERISTICS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS PUBLICATIONS, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cvict_v.htm#publications.
204
Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1283, 1287.
205
Id. at 1238, 1268 (demonstrating how law absorbs social meaning “and
thus constitutes gender inequity.”); cf. LEILA AHMED, WOMEN AND GENDER IN
ISLAM 245 (1992) (arguing that Western cultures are not less androcentric or
misogynist than Middle Eastern societies, “but that women in Western societies
were able to draw on the political vocabularies and systems generated by ideas
of democracy and the rights of the individual, vocabularies and political systems
developed by white male middle classes to safeguard their interests and not
intended to be applicable to women.”).
206
Lorber, supra note 108, at 40, 53 (describing how gendered people
emerge from the social order, beginning with assignment to a sex category at
birth, which becomes a gender status through naming, dress, and other gender
markers).
Once a child’s gender is evident, others treat those in one gender
differently from those in the other, and the children respond to the
different treatment by feeling different and behaving differently . . . .
Adolescent boys and girls approach and avoid each other in an
elaborately scripted and gendered mating dance. Parenting is gendered,
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who kill abusive men, like the retreat rules, may be seen as
manifestations of relations of domination and subordination. They
reflect the ways in which the law and the legal system are
constructed to meet the needs and interests of the prototypical
human being—a male batterer—not a woman who lives with a
battering man.207
C. The Norms: Self-Defense for Women Who Kill Battering
Men
In the next turn of the hermeneutic, the normative principles
that constitute the law of self-defense are interrogated. The claim
of self-defense by a woman who has killed a battering man is
structured by doctrines that often are hostile to her experiences.
Four main issues in the jurisprudence of self-defense are as
follows: 1) the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions; 2) the
proportionality of the force employed; 3) the defendant’s duty to
retreat, if required; and 4) the temporal proximity or imminence of
the danger.208 As presently constituted, for women who kill
abusive men, the defense is nearly impossible to prove.209

with different expectations for mothers and fathers, and people of
different genders work at different kinds of jobs.
Id. at 40.
207
Meier, supra note 17, at 1302 (observing that men who batter frequently
test within the normal range on psychiatric tests, while victims are typically seen
as pathological); see also HERMAN, supra note 18, at 75 (noting that Adolph
Eichmann, who had committed terrible crimes against humanity, had been
certified as normal by a half a dozen psychiatrists); Koons, Making Peace, supra
note 13, at 35-40 (decentering the normative center of the law that protects the
interests of White, Euro-American, heterosexual men of privilege).
208
Maguigan, supra note 18, at 385; see also DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING,
supra note 28, at 221-23 (outlining the elements of self-defense as including
necessity, proportionality, and a reasonable-belief rule “that is based on
reasonable appearances, rather than on objective reality.”).
209
Douglas A. Orr, Weiand v. State and Battered Spouse Syndrome: The
Toothless Tigress Can Now Roar, 74 FLA. BAR. J. 14, 16 (2000).
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1. The Reasonableness of the Defendant’s Actions
As part of the first issue in a claim of self-defense—the
reasonableness of the defendant’s actions—evidence of the
battered woman syndrome has been held by many states to be
relevant to the reasonableness of a woman’s belief that she was in
imminent danger of death or serious injury.210 Developed by Dr.
Lenore Walker in 1979, the battered woman syndrome was
conceived as a behavioral condition that arose out of prolonged
exposure to an ongoing three-stage cycle of abuse: the “tensionbuilding” phase that includes verbal and psychological abuse in
conjunction with less extreme physical abuse; the “acute battering
incident” stage in which uncontrolled battering occurs; and the
“loving contrition” phase in which the battering man expresses
remorse and attempts reconciliation.211 Walker proposed that the
unpredictability and intermittency of the battering cycle have longterm effects on a “battered woman.”212 To explain why some
210

“[A] person is justified in using force to protect himself if he
subjectively believes, and has objectively reasonable grounds for believing, that
such force is necessary to repel an imminent unlawful attack, even if
appearances prove to be false” DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 28, at
222. The purpose of evidence of the battered woman syndrome is to “explain to
jurors why the defendant subjectively believed that the decedent was about to
kill her (when he may have been asleep or otherwise passive); and to
demonstrate that this belief was objectively reasonable to a person suffering
from the syndrome.” Id. at 242. In some cases, women who kill battering men
may raise the defense of Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance (EMED) to
the charge of murder and be found guilty of the lesser offense of manslaughter.
Id. at 541-43 (noting the subjective component of the defense (the extreme
mental or emotional disturbance) and the objective component (a reasonable
explanation or excuse for the EMED)).
211
LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 95-96 (1984)
[hereinafter WALKER, SYNDROME]; see also LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN (1979) [hereinafter WALKER, WOMAN]; LENORE WALKER, TERRIFYING
LOVE (1989).
212
Walker defined a “battered woman” as a woman “in an intimate
relationship with a man who repeatedly subjects . . . her to forceful physical
and/or psychological abuse.” WALKER, SYNDROME, supra note 211, at 203
(defining “abuse” in six ways, from life-threatening violence to “extreme verbal
harassment and expressing comments of a derogatory nature with negative value
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women do not leave battering relationships, Walker applied the
psychological construct of “learned helplessness.”213
Judicial reception of the battered woman syndrome has
reformed the law of domestic violence.214 While applauding the
progress that has been wrung from Walker’s work, particularly
expanding the base of relevant evidence, a number of critics have
taken issue with the battered woman syndrome and the principle of
learned helplessness.215 For example, the battered woman
judgments.”).
213
The psychological theory of learned helplessness was developed by
Martin Seligman based on laboratory experiments conducted on caged dogs who
were given random electrical shocks and who eventually became passive and
refused to leave their cages even when it became possible for them to do so. See
WALKER, WOMAN, supra note 211, at 45-48 (discussing Seligman’s theory); see
also Martin Seligman et al., Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in the Dog, 73
J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 256 (1968). Walker applied Seligman’s theory of
learned helplessness to women who had been battered, noting that when women
“are operating from a belief of helplessness, the perception becomes reality and
they become passive, submissive, ‘‘helpless.’” Id. at 48; see also Mahoney,
supra note 17, at 38-43 (observing that learned helplessness is described by
courts “with varying degrees of sophistication as a deficiency in perceiving
escape possibilities or a psychological adjustment to economic dependence,
love, and the failure of the legal system to respond adequately to the problem.”).
214
“The clear trend is to permit syndrome evidence in cases of
confrontational homicides . . ., assuming that the defendant presents evidence of
a history of abuse. Courts are divided on how to deal with nonconfrontational
cases.” DRESSLER, CRIMINAL, supra note 170, at 532. In a survey of 223
homicide cases defended by women who were battered, Holly Maguigan
calculated that seventy-five percent of the incidents involved confrontations,
twenty percent were nonconfrontational (with four percent as contract killings,
eight percent sleeping-man cases, and eight percent in which the defendant was
the initial aggressor during a lull in the violence). Maguigan, supra note 18, at
396-97 (also noting that five percent of the appellate opinions did not include a
discussion of the factual basis of the offense).
215
Mahoney, supra note 17, at 41-42 (opting not to discard “such a major
tool in the effort to explain women’s experience in court, just because it has
proved vulnerable to distortion in culture and law”); see also Meier, supra note
17, at 1305-11 (recognizing the battered woman syndrome as a “watershed in
social and legal understandings of domestic violence” and that the syndrome
“has not always advanced justice for battered women.”); Alafair S. Burke,
Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, Out
of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C.L. REV. 211, 216 (2002) (arguing that the
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syndrome has been characterized as creating a “narrow stereotype
of the archetypal woman entitled to claim victimization.”216
Women who deviate from the image of the “perfect victim,”
including women who demonstrate capacity for action, aggression,
or independence, continue to be convicted of murder and
manslaughter for killing their abusers.217 Critics have noted that
Walker’s findings (primarily based on the experiences of white,
middle class women) pose particular problems for women of color
and women who are poor.218 Juries may be especially unlikely to
see African American women, who have long been depicted as
strong and aggressive, as coming within the image of
“helplessness.”219
More significantly, perhaps, the syndrome has been challenged
as pathologizing women who have been battered by reinforcing
oppressive images of women as weak and crazy, rather than
recognizing women as rational actors who acted reasonably to save
their lives.220 Because the battered woman syndrome points to
helplessness and incapacity to reason, it undermines the “logic of
self-defense,” which is based on an ability to reason and to react
when in danger.221 Consequently, the battered woman syndrome
battered woman syndrome “does nothing to jettison the faulty doctrinal rules
that formed the impetus for the syndrome theory as a litigation strategy.”).
216
Meier, supra note 17, at 1306.
217
Id.
218
Id. at 1307 n.33; see also Theresa Raffaele Jefferson, Note, Toward a
Black Feminist Jurisprudence, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 263, 290 (1998)
(relaying story of “Debra,” whose “identity as a Black lesbian problematized the
battered woman’s syndrome defense.”).
219
Id. One of the cultural images of African-American women is that of
“mules uh de world.” PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 43
(1991) (quoting from Nanny, an elderly African-American woman who was
explaining the “place” of Black women to her granddaughter in ZORA NEALE
HURSTON, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD 16 (1937)).
220
Mahoney, supra note 17, at 4, 42 (proposing that the battered woman
syndrome and explanations that emphasize “helplessness: can “perpetuate
existing oppressive stereotypes of battered women.”); Burke, supra note 215, at
218 (advocating a “rational actor approach” that recognizes battered women as
autonomous and competent decision-makers and their necessary use of force as
justified, not excused).
221
Jill E. Adams, Unlocking Liberty: Is California’s Habeas Law the Key
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may create an internal inconsistency that undermines proof of the
first aspect of the claim of self-defense.222
2. The Proportionality of the Force Employed
The second question in a claim of self-defense, the
proportionality of the force employed, poses an additional
interpretive hurdle for women who kill battering men.223 Even
women who use force in response to an immediate attack may be
excluded from a narrow definition of self-defense because they use
deadly force to respond to an attack that judges and juries do not
see as posing a deadly threat.224 In many of these cases, the woman
used deadly force when the battering man was threatening verbally
or with his fists.225 One study found that, of 223 cases defended by
women who killed battering men, only five percent of the cases
involved the man’s use of a weapon other than his hands; in each
to Freeing Unjustly Imprisoned Battered Women?, 19 BERKELEY’ WOMEN’S
L.J. 217, 224 (2004) (relaying critique of the battered woman syndrome as
“signaling incapacity to employ reason” and citing DONALD ALEXANDER
DOWNS, MORE THAN VICTIMS: BATTERED WOMEN, THE SYNDROME SOCIETY,
AND THE LAW 6-7 (1996)); Mahoney, supra note 17, at 4 (contrasting feminist
explanations of women acting rationally under oppression with a simpler version
told through the lens of cultural stereotypes of women as too helpless or
dysfunctional to take reasonable action); see also Burke, supra note 215, at 247
(arguing that the syndrome fails to explain why a woman kills an abusive
partner in a non-confrontational situation: “The heightened and prolonged fear,
cognitive impairment, and submissiveness described by the syndrome theory are
inconsistent with a sudden decision to act at all, let alone with deadly force.”).
222
Meier, supra note 17, at 1314-22 (discussing newer psychological
approaches—post traumatic stress disorder, “redefined” battered woman
syndrome, and entrapment or social control theories—that explicitly take social
context into account).
223
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 28, at 222 (advising that “a
person is never permitted to use deadly force to repel a nondeadly attack”).
224
Developments, supra note 31, at 1577; see also Fischer, supra note 134,
at 2120 (explaining that seemingly innocent gestures—a nose scratch, a look, a
drawn line gesture—are part of patterns of domination and are properly
interpreted as “threatening symbols” by a woman who lives with a battering
man).
225
Id.
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case, the woman used a weapon.226
3. The Defendant’s Duty to Retreat
The third inquiry in self-defense, whether the defendant
retreated to the greatest degree possible, sets up a normative
faultline for women who have killed battering men. In particular,
to require a woman to demonstrate that leaving the room was “not
reasonably possible without increasing her own danger of death or
great bodily harm” unfairly burdens her with disproving one of the
great myths of intimate violence—that she could have left.227
“Why didn’t she leave?” has plagued cases in which women claim
self-defense in killing a battering man.228 The question is
legitimated when the law frames her defense in terms of an
implicit duty to retreat.
By posing the “leaving question” in a jury instruction, the law
establishes a normative assumption that exit is the appropriate
response to violence and hides the strategies that women have
engaged to avoid or stop the battering.229 The question wrongly
226

Maguigan, supra note 18, at 416 n.131; see also State v. Wanrow, 559
P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (reversing murder conviction of a mother who killed a
child sex offender because the jury instruction established an objective standard
that implied that the case were to be judged as if it were an altercation between
two men).
The impression created—that a 5’4” woman with a cast on her leg
and using a crutch must, under the law, somehow repel an assault by a
6’2” intoxicated man without employing weapons in her defense . . . —
constitutes a separate and distinct misstatement of the law and, in the
context of this case, violates respondent’s right to equal protection of
the law.
Id.; see also Leti Volpp, On Culture, Difference, and Domestic Violence, 11 AM.
U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 393 (2003) (discussing the exclusion of Ms.
Wanrow’s Native American heritage from her defense).
227
Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1057 (Fla. 1999) (adopting interim
jury instruction); see also Standard Jury Instructions—Criminal Cases (Castle
Doctrine), 789 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 2000) (authorizing edited jury instruction).
228
Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 1026 (characterizing the question of
leaving as a “depressingly perennial inquiry”).
229
Fischer, supra note 134, at 2136 (relaying data from a study that women
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implies not only that leaving is possible, but also that it will bring
safety.230
Ignoring the reality of the dynamics of battering, the law
sometimes overtly places on women who kill battering men the
burden of proving that they could not retreat without increasing the
danger of death or great bodily harm.231 With the case oriented
around such a normative center, jurors will be invited to question
why a defending woman could not undertake the “simple act” of
leaving the room.232 Because a judge may not permit a full
evidentiary exploration of the battering relationship, jurors may not
have sufficient information to understand why leaving a room may
be dangerous.233

who were battered tried an average of thirteen strategies to stop the violence);
Mahoney, supra note 17, at 81 (proposing that separation assault affirms the
difficulties of exiting and the rationality of a woman’s perception of the danger
of exiting).
230
Most women who live with battering men do leave at some point.
Meier, supra note 17, at 1311 n.52. However, their leaving does not end the
violence. Id. Violence often increases when a woman attempts to leave.
Anderson, supra note 152, at 93 (offering results of a study showing that
“women who leave suffer significantly more violence than women who never
leave.”); Mahoney, supra note 17, at 64-65 (noting that “[a]t least half of women
who leave their abusers are followed and harassed or further attacked by
them.”).
231
E.g., Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1057 (setting forth interim jury instruction
that articulated a “duty to retreat to the extent reasonably possible without
increasing [his / her] own danger of death or great bodily harm.”).
232
Id. at 1044-49, 1054 (noting the key role of retreat in the closing
arguments of the prosecuting attorney—”that the killing could not be considered
justifiable homicide unless Weiand had exhausted every reasonable means to
escape the danger”).
233
Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 985 (noting that jurors typically have
not been given the evidence needed to understand motivation, which is critical
to making sense of domestic violence cases); Mahoney, supra note 17, at 43
(arguing that “[e]videntiary rules and courtroom bias . . . continue to skew the
image of women in the self-defense cases, and these cases continue to contribute
to cultural images that in turn shape law.”). But see Maguigan, supra note 18, at
383 (arguing that a survey of homicide cases defended by women who were
battered did not support the assumption that existing legal definitions excluded
judicial consideration of social context).
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4. The Temporal Proximity or Imminence of the Danger
The fourth consideration in the law of self-defense asks
whether the defendant was responding to an imminent threat.234
While it appears to be an “objective” standard (for example, the
time lag between the threat and the response), imminence is
actually a fuzzy concept that incorporates social norms about
women’s relationships with men.235 That imminence has a
mercurial nature is illustrated by the varying directions and
proximities to which it points. In some cases, it asks whether
danger is imminent; in others it asks whether the closer notion of a
threat is imminent; in others it asks whether an attack, closer still,
is imminent; in others it switches perspective and asks whether the
harm to defendant or another is imminent; in still others it asks the
defendant to assess whether a forcible felony is imminent.236
Illustrating the shift in perspective from attacker to defendant is the
Model Penal Code, which does not focus on the threat, but on the
response of the defendant (as being “immediately necessary”).237
234

DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 28, at 222 (advising that
imminence is an aspect of the necessity component of self-defense).
235
Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1238, 1267; see also Rosen, supra
note 20, at 381 (discussing imminence as a translator and inhibitor of necessity).
236
E.g., Rasley v. State, 878 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(noting rules applicable to self-defense, including a demonstration by a
defendant of circumstances causing a reasonable prudent person to believe that
danger was imminent); Developments, supra note 31, at 1576 (advising that
most jurisdictions permit force to be used to prevent imminent threat of unlawful
physical force); Standard Jury Instructions—Criminal Cases (Castle Doctrine),
789 So. 2d at 955 (predicating “defense of home” instruction on an attack); The
Florida Bar Re: Standard Jury Instructions Criminal Cases, 477 So. 2d. 985, 999
(Fla. 1985) (authorizing instructions for justifiable use of deadly force, including
imminent death or great bodily harm and imminent commission of forcible
felony).
237
The Model Penal Code states: “[T]he use of force upon or toward
another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of
unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.” MODEL PENAL
CODE ‘ 3.04(1) (1985). Two changes were made by the Model Penal Code to
traditional self-defense theory: 1) not requiring that defendant’s belief be
reasonable; and 2) focusing on defendant’s belief that the use of force is
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Imminence absorbs meanings of immediacy, as well as
mediacy.238 When viewed as “immediate,” imminence functions in
lock-step with an incident-based notion of battering, erasing the
context of a battering relationship.239 Furthermore, in separation
assault, it is the separation itself which is being attacked, with
assault taking place over a period of time.240 Consequently, when
imminence is read as “immediate,” the consequences are
devastating to women who have survived in a climate of pervasive
battering.241
The most insidious norms absorbed by imminence are those
that reflect social views that women should leave battering
relationships. When read into imminence, a standard is created
that, in effect, requires women to leave, not just a confrontation,
but a relationship before a confrontation takes place.242 In this
sense, imminence functions as a pre-retreat rule.243 Requiring preretreat is clearly specious, as no rule would stand that, for example,
required a man to leave a bar before a fight broke out.244 Yet, even
immediately necessary. E-mail from Mark Summers, Professor of Law, Barry
University School of Law, to Judith E. Koons, Associate Professor of Law,
Barry University School of Law (Aug. 16, 2005, 5:18 PM EST) (on file with
author). Due to these changes (adopting a wholly subjective standard and
shifting the emphasis from the victim to the defendant), the Model Penal Codes
definition of self-defense “more easily accommodates the domestic violence
paradigm.” Id.
238
Mahoney, supra note 17, at 84 (criticizing decisions that confuse
imminence and immediacy); see also Hunter v. State, 687 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (defining imminent as “near at hand, mediate rather
than immediate, close rather than touching,” quoting Linsley v. State, 101 So.
273 (Fla. 1924)).
239
Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 972.
240
Mahoney, supra note 17, at 65-66 (noting, too, that the attack on the
separation usually is not recognized).
241
Id. at 84.
242
Nourse, Relational, supra note 108, at 37-38.
243
Id. at 37 n.56.
244
Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1284 (stating that a “man who
goes for the fiftieth time to the violent gang-bar is not deprived of his selfdefense claim because he ‘‘should have left’ before the violence erupted.”).
Kimberly Rasley was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to a
twenty-five year minimum mandatory sentence for use of a firearm in
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where the law has rejected a de jure duty to retreat, jurors may be
invited to consider, through the lens of imminence, whether the
defendant had time to go out the door (or leave the relationship)
before an incident of abuse took place.245
The normative power of the law should support a woman’s
right of self-defense, not mandating that she fit the reality of
gender domination into an inhospitable legal framework.246
Furthermore, the normative power of the law should establish the
value of personal safety, rather than a fictional and dangerous act
of retreat.247 Influencing all interactions between people, the law
shapes the identities, goals, and actions of people.248 Establishing a
duty for women to first attempt leaving, even a room, is teaching
women to disregard their own safety.
commission of the offense of killing her abusive husband after he had pushed
her violently into the bedroom wall, left the house, and returned shortly
thereafter. Rasley v. State, 878 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
He came through a double-locked door and, despite her entreaties to stop,
continued to advance toward her until she shot him 24 to 42 inches away. Id. at
475. Although she stated the belief that, if she had not obtained and used the
weapon, he would have beaten her to death, the court affirmed the conviction
and sentence because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could
conclude that she “had other reasonable options besides that of deadly force to
avoid the danger posed by her husband’s advance, including retreat . . . .” Id. at
475, 477.
245
Id. at 1247, 1268; see also Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1048-49
(Fla. 1999) (quoting prosecutor’s closing argument: “She had to exhaust every
reasonable means of escape prior to killing him. Did she do that? No. Did she
use the phone that was two feet away? No. Did she go out the door where her
baby was sitting next to? No.”).
246
Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 960, 962 (discussing “flawed
paradigms” that structure the criminal justice system’s response to the harms
suffered by women who live with battering men).
247
Wheatcroft, supra note 146, at 559-60 (noting the policy decision made
by non-retreat jurisdictions, “not with a cavalier disregard for the value of
human life but, rather,” to protect the victim and enable her to use force
necessary to save her life).
248
Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 1018 n.315, 1019 (discussing how the
law influences human behavior, interactions, and identity and assuming “a
mutating, bi-directionally permeable border between law and society”); Nourse,
Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1293 (explaining that the “law constitutes us and
our relationship to the political order.”).
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While some women who live with battering men may be
apprised of the danger of leaving, other women may not be aware
that forms of leaving may place them at significant risk.249 In one
study, half of the survivors of femicide attempts reported that they
were “completely surprised by the attack.”250 One woman broke up
with a “gentle giant” who had no history of abuse.251 After she
agreed to meet with him as friends, he tied her up and beat her for
twelve hours.252 In response to the assertion that “women should
be more aware,” the woman asserted: “Excuse me. If there are no
signs to you—no previous throwing, hitting, screaming—how are
you supposed to know what’s going to happen?”253
The precipitating event in most of these homicidal attacks was
the attempt by women to end the relationships.254 According to one
woman’s description:
I sit on my bed and he looks and me and says, ‘So what you
are telling me is that you do not love me anymore.’ I said,
‘No.’ ‘You want me out of the house?’ I said, ‘I do.’ He
says, ‘O.K., well then I am going to kill you.’ That is when
he lunged at me.255
Another woman who survived a femicide attempt stated: “I
didn’t really realize what big trouble I was in until I was to the
point of where I thought I was going to die.”256 The
unpredictability, complexity, and variety of abuse reported by
women support the premise that the law should not set a normative
baseline of leaving, whether it be a room, residence, or

249

Nicolaidis, supra note 130, at 791.
Id.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Nicolaidis, supra note 130, at 791.
256
Id.; see also State v. Griffiths, 610 P.2d 522 (Idaho 1980) (recounting
that the “defendant shot her husband after seeing a look in his eyes which she
had seen only once before when he choked her to near insensibility.”); Waits,
supra note 197, at 37 (discussing “the look” that Mary’s abusive husband would
give her to exercise control).
250
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relationship.257
Although formally adopting a no-retreat stance, the Florida
legislature also reinforced the standard of imminence, effectively
instantiating a requirement of retreat. Retreat rules place many
women in the position of negotiating for their safety. The law must
recognize that safety is non-negotiable.258
D. The Meanings: A Jurisprudence of Gendered Violence
The final movement of the hermeneutic pauses on questions of
meaning, purpose, and value. That interpretive turn will be made
by evaluating the ways in which gendered violence is mapped onto
dichotomies that are erected in the law.
Americans are in the grips of a love affair with violence and
guns.259 At the same time, narratives about crime—“emotional,
contradictory, and bewildering”—occupy the center of U.S.
politics.260 Violence is one of the common denominators of
oppression.261 People whose lives are marked by oppression may
live with the specter of random, unprovoked attacks that have no
motive other than to harm a person out of a sense of fear or hatred
of the oppressed group.262 Violence may be best characterized as a
“social practice” that is anticipated to reoccur because violence is
“always on the horizon of social imagination, even for those who
do not perpetrate it.”263 Group violence is legitimated in American

257

Nicolaidis, supra note 130, at 793 (cautioning clinicians against pushing
women to leave abusive relationships before addressing safety issues).
258
Fischer, supra note 134, at 2153 (citing empirical work from which
advocates argue that women “should never have to negotiate for their physical
safety.’).
259
Fine, supra note 118, at 16.
260
Id.
261
Oppression has been defined as “the institutional constraint on selfdevelopment.” YOUNG, supra note 130, at 37. Explicating a structural analysis
of relations of power in society, Young identified five faces of oppression:
exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence.
Id. at 49-62.
262
Id. at 61.
263
Id. at 62.
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society, in that it is tolerated, if not applauded.264 Those who
perpetrate acts of oppressive violence may receive little to no
punishment.265 In contrast, a violent act by a woman may touch a
depth of horror that triggers sweeping retribution.266
American culture is marked by three articulated sites of
violence: street violence, in which the public space in some
communities is dominated by the drug markets; “state-initiated
violence,” in which communities of color criticize police
harassment and the flight of jobs and capital from their
communities; and domestic violence, in which women are
terrorized in their homes by male partners.267 The widely varying
accounts of the location of violence in communities by the race,
264

In a study of the life histories of 154 poor and working-class adults in
Jersey City and Buffalo, one of the stories described the response of the police
to a white man’s report of a break-in: “[O]ne cop said to me that it was too bad
that you didn’t catch him inside the house because then you would have killed
him and we wouldn’t have said anything.” Fine, supra note 118, at 8; see also
DRESSLER, CRIMINAL supra note 170, at 526-27 (noting that the President
declared in 2002 that we must be able to stop rogue states and terrorists before
they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction and questioning: “If
so-called ‘preemptive self-defense’ is being conducted at the international level,
is there any reason to deny the right to battered women to kill their ‘rogue’ and
‘terrorist’ partners before they are able to threaten, much less use, deadly
force?”).
265
E.g., Gregory Howard Williams, Controlling the Use of Non-Deadly
Force: Policy and Practice, 10 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 79, 103 (1993) (noting
that law enforcement agencies “have not been vigilant in punishing officers who
have repeatedly used excessive force” and citing the example of Miami officials
sustaining 10 of 172 excessive force complaints between 1988 and 1991,
resulting in one officer’s leaving the police force of 2,457 officers); see also
Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L.
REV. 1275 (1999) (questioning why the story of police brutality is
“anecdotalized” as unusual, an aberration).
266
E.g., MORRISSEY, supra note 18 passim (critiquing portrayal of women
killers as victims, sufferers of mental illness, and inhuman monsters and arguing
that the portrayals deny human agency); see also Anne Taylor Fleming, Crime
and Motherhood: Maternal Madness, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 2002, at 4-3
(discussing the capital murder conviction of Andrea Yates for the murder of her
children and her depiction as “demon mother writ large” despite her mental
illness).
267
Fine, supra note 118, at 7.
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gender, and class of respondents demonstrate that perceptions of
violence in the United States are deeply raced, gendered and
classed. In one study of crime and violence in two low-income
urban communities, white men offered racialized narratives of
street crime while African-American men and Latinos focused on
state violence, detailing examples of disproportionate arrests of
men of color and increased prison construction.268 White women
offered scenes of pervasive male-perpetrated violence among
family members while many African-American women and
Latinas detailed incidents of home-based violence, street violence,
and state-initiated violence, primarily in the welfare office.269
As reflected in the strengthened castle doctrine and other crime
bills, public policy emphasizes street crime, but has offered
inadequate redress for domestic abuse, and has been silent on state
abuse.270 A terrible gender irony for many women is that the home
front is often more dangerous than the streets.271 However, in the
United States, the policy answer for violence speaks from the
privileged standpoint of elite white men.272 The experiences of
white women and people of color are often relegated to the narrow,
confusing, and contradictory margins of the law.
Race, gender, and class fissures in the law find their heritage in
Western philosophy. At the dawn of modernity, Enlightenment
thinkers structured their thought around binaries—reason / passion,
mind / body, and public / private.273 A key construct underlying
268

Id.
Id. at 15 (offering this narrative by a Latina describing efforts to get the
police to respond: “You call 911 and say, ‘‘Okay, I’m calling from such and
such a building. There’s kids hanging outside. It’s 3 o’clock in the morning. I
can’t sleep.’ The cops won’t come. They won’t come. They will never show up.
Or, there’s a domestic fight in apartment such and such. You’ll sit there and die
before they come. I mean the wife will be dead, and he’ll beat her to death
before the cops ever come.”).
270
Id. at 8, 18.
271
Id. at 6 (observing that “[f]or poor and working-class men and women,
life on the streets may be tough. But for women, life may be tougher still at
home.”).
272
Id. at 8, 18.
273
The Enlightenment brought the dawning of modernity, that enormous
change in European thought dating from the mid-sixteenth century which
269

KOONS MACROED 07-30-06.DOC

684

7/30/2006 12:34 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Western philosophy and science is the subject / object binary.274 In
this worldview, the subject is panoptically centered while all who
are “different” are viewed as “other” and marginalized.275 The
process of “othering” is hierarchical, in that the other is marked,
subordinated, and rendered invisible.276
rejected the dogma and substantive rationality of religious and metaphysical
world-views. ELISABETH SCHÜSSLER FIORENZA, RHETORIC AND ETHIC 35
(1999) (defining modernity in terms of procedural rationality which gives
credence to objective knowledge, moral practical insight, and aesthetic judgment
and defining postmodernity as critical thought based on its modern predecessor,
but posing three correctives—aesthetic (experiential concreteness and intuitive
imagination are stressed over rationalist abstraction), cultural (cultural autonomy
and the wisdom of particular community are emphasized over universalization),
and political (power is seen as the starting point, not reason). With many of the
Enlightenment thinkers, reason was associated with the male, while passion /
disorder / nature were associated with the female. E.g., GENEVIEVE LLOYD, THE
MAN OF REASON 77 (2d ed. 1993) (evaluating the “maleness of Reason” in the
thought of such philosophers as Jean Jacques Rousseau by explicating his view
that the “disorder of women” was a “threat to the public life of citizenship” and
served as a rationale for women’s exclusion from citizenship).
274
YOUNG, supra note 130, at 99, 126, 147.
275
Id. at 99, 147 (noting, too, that there is only one subject position).
Simone de Beauvoir conceived the “Other” in 1949 as the metaphor by which
women have been set aside and subordinated in a discourse constructed to
protect the interests of privileged White men. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE
SECOND SEX (1949); see also SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF 158
(1992) (presenting conceptions of self as the “generalized” and “concrete”
other).
276
Euro-English language is shot through with binaries that are hierarchical
dyads—right / wrong, tall / short, fast / slow, good / bad, happy / unhappy—with
preferred and disfavored polarities. MARY BELENKY ET AL., A TRADITION THAT
HAS NO NAME: NURTURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEOPLE, FAMILIES, AND
COMMUNITIES 21 (1997) (featuring the work of psychologists and linguists to
explain the gendered nature of the binaries that constitute our
language).Linguists found that, with each binary, there is a pole that is
“unmarked” and a pole that is “marked.” Id. The positive or unmarked pole
denotes the entire scale and is associated with men, while the marked pole only
refers to the negative end of the pole and is associated with women. Id. The
unmarked pole, reserved for men, is the favored dyad, while the marked pole is
tainted with “girl stain.” Id. “Mankind” is an unmarked term and operates to
identify men as well as all of humanity. Id. at 22. “Womankind” is marked and,
because of the taint of gender, is too polluting to include men. Id. Male language
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In Western philosophy, the other serves as the object for the
subject.277 When human beings become objects, violence against
them is justified: “Underlying all violence is a human being that
has been reduced to the status of an object.”278 Consequently, the
binarist structure of law and philosophy, with the paradigmatic
centering of the elite white male subject and the othering of
subordinated people, serves as the structural basis of race, gender,
and class violence.
The public / private binary is also a key feature in the
landscape of domestic violence and the law. In the mid-1700s,
Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau gave primacy
to a gendered division between public and private spheres.279 Also
conceptualizing distinctions between reason and nature, Rousseau
considered the closeness of women to nature and passion to justify
their exclusion from citizenship.280 The “disorder of women”
served as a threat to public citizenship.281 Rousseau solved the
riddle by making men good citizens in the public sphere while
locating women as good persons in the private domain.282 Linking
the spheres, Rousseau viewed the private domain as “the nursery”
in which women would raise good citizens who would animate
that is offered as “generic” is actually linguistically coded language that
represents the interests of men. Id.; see also YOUNG, supra note 130, at 59
(describing the paradox of cultural imperialism is that it not only marks out
certain groups, it also renders the groups invisible).
277
YOUNG, supra note 130, at 136.
278
Fr. John Kavanaugh, Challenging a Commodity Culture, COMMONWEAL
606, 608 (Nov. 1984) (proposing that alternatives to the hegemony of
commodification must be lived in a full dialectic that embraces interiority,
relationships, social commitments, simplicity, and compassion).
279
LLOYD, supra note 273, at 78 (noting, in Rousseau’s thought, the
“complementarity between male and female character is mapped onto the
public-private distinction”); see also Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the
Public / Private Dichotomy, in THE DISORDER OF WOMEN 118, 118-40 (1989)
(critiquing the patriarchal character of liberalism and tracing the liberal
theoretical division between the public and private to JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1689)).
280
LLOYD, supra note 273, at 77.
281
Id.
282
Id.
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public life.283
Wife abuse in the private sphere was condoned at common
law.284 Blackstone advised:
The husband also (by the old law) might give his wife
moderate correction. For, as he is to answer for her
misbehavior, the law thought it reasonable to intrust him
with this power of restraining her, by domestic
chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed
to correct his servants or children.285
In the United States, the “discourse of affectional privacy”
undergirded the refusal of courts to interfere with a husband’s
moderate correction of his wife.286 Affirming the trial court’s
decision that a man who whipped his wife with a switch was not
guilty of battery as a matter of law, the North Carolina Supreme
Court reasoned that it would not disturb “family government in
trifling cases” because:
[H]owever great are the evils of ill temper, quarrels, and
even personal conflicts inflicting only temporary pain, they
are not comparable with the evils which would result from
raising the curtain, and exposing to public curiosity and
criticism, the nursery and the bed chamber.287
283

Id.at 77-78.
Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 969.
285
BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at 1:432 (also asserting: “But, with us, in
the politer reign of Charles the second, this power of correction began to be
doubted . . . . Yet the lower rank of people, who were always fond of the old
common law, still claim and exert their antient privilege: and the courts of law
will still permit a husband to restrain a wife of her liberty, in case of any gross
misbehaviour.”); see also Hazel D. Lord, Husband and Wife: English Marriage
Law From 1750, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 53 (2001) (debunking
as a “myth” that the right of moderate correction included the “rule of thumb,”
whereby a husband could beat his wife with a stick as long as its diameter was
no thicker than his thumb and noting the possible origins of this legend in a
statement made by Sir Francis Buller in 1792, for which he was excoriated).
286
Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wifebeating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996).
287
State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 457 (N.C. 1868) (questioning, too, what
standards of provocation would be appropriate for the “hovel,” the middle class,
and the “higher ranks.”); see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A
284
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The split between the public and private domains was squarely
challenged by second wave feminists in their charge that the
“personal is political.”288 The woman’s movement made public
issues out of practices—including domestic violence—that had
been considered too private or trivial for political and public
discussion.289 Due to contemporary public policies that effect
broad cutbacks for people who are poor, commentators have
suggested that women are being “swept into the corners of a
reinstitutionalized ‘private’ sphere” without adequate resources.290
These critics also forecast that, with the shrinking of the public
sphere, “women will get beaten with more regularity, with fewer
options and more muzzled critiques.”291
Violence against women in their homes continues to have
legitimacy due to a gendered division between the public and the
private spheres. One study posited that, as men in low-income
urban communities lost economic power due to the shrinkage of
public sector and unionized jobs, they attempted to assert power in

History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373 (2000) (noting that “[a] majority
of states still retain some form of the common law regime” that exempts
husbands from prosecution for raping their wives: “They criminalize a narrower
range of offenses if committed within marriage, subject the marital rape they do
recognize to less serious sanctions, and/or create special procedural hurdles for
marital rape prosecutions.”).
288
YOUNG, supra note 130, at 120. COLLINS, supra note 219, at 47
(observing that women of color have “never fit” the model of the dichotomous
split between work (public) and family (private)). The slogan, “the personal is
political,” was coined by Carol Hanisch in a duplex on N.W. 3rd Place in
Gainesville, Florida, in March of 1968. Carol Giardina, Action Knowledges:
Radical Feminism in Gainesville, Florida, 1964-89, Address at the “Cultivating
Knowledges” Twenty-fifth Anniversary Symposium of the Center for Women’s
Studies and Gender Research at the University of Florida (Oct. 26, 2002) (notes
on file with the author) (noting, too, that the phrase was related to the work of
Beverly Jones and Judith Benninger Brown, whose paper, Toward a Female
Liberation Movement, was published in the spring of 1968).
289
YOUNG, supra note 130, at 120.
290
Fine, supra note 118, at 10.
291
Id. (also forecasting that women will be held in the violence of the
private sphere “by the hollowing of the economy and the retreat of public sector
services for women and children.”).
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the domestic sphere.292 Stories told by these men were stories of
loss—the loss of privilege—that were situated in a discourse of
property rights.293
The obsession of Americans with private property rights adds
another layer of “justification” to gendered intimate violence.
Cases that uphold the duty to retreat for cohabitors are often based
squarely on the primacy of property rights.294 Placing property
rights over personal safety has absurd and deadly consequences. In
one case, a man described as a “withdrawn workaholic” had
moved out of the marital home but then began stalking his wife,
leading to the following incident:
One night he went through her home with a sledgehammer,
chainsaw, and toxic chemicals, destroying everything the
family owned. Though neighbors called the police, the
police felt they could not intervene as he was an owner of
the house and there was no restraining order against him.
The next morning, he was waiting for her in the house with
a loaded crossbow.295
Sheltered by the rhetoric of private property, de jure and de
facto duties to retreat serve to insulate intimate male violence from
legal accountability.296
CONCLUSION
For many women who defend themselves in their homes and in
the courts, the law supports and conceals an elaborate system of
domination, subordination, and control.297 While this system is
292

Id. at 8; see also DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, supra note 112, at 1, 5
(reporting that, while domestic violence is statistically consistent across racial
and ethnic categories, “past and current victims of domestic violence are overrepresented” among women who receive welfare).
293
Fine, supra note 118, at 8.
294
Carpenter, supra note 3 passim.
295
Nicolaidis, supra note 130, at 791 (emphasis supplied).
296
Cf. Balos, supra note at 193, 105 (arguing that it is “time for the
doctrine of privacy to stop sheltering perpetrators of sexual harassment in the
home.”).
297
Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 985.
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veiled by race, class, and gender privilege in a discourse that
naturalizes oppression, occasionally an adjustment in the law
creates a shift that allows observers to catch a glimpse of deep
structural flaws in legal doctrines.298 The recent shifts in the retreat
and castle doctrines provide a vantage point for observing the legal
construction of relations of subordination and domination for
women, battering men, and the legal system.299
By way of Potter’s Boxes, this article has traveled into the
rupture between some of the controlling legal doctrines and the
experiences of many women who live with battering men.300 To
examine the facts of battering, the article has noted the
pervasiveness of physical and non-physical abuse of women by
intimate male partners. The article challenges the factual basis for
duties to retreat by juxtaposing them with the well-known
phenomenon of separation assault, by which patterns of violence
escalate upon a decision, threat, or move to separate from an
abuser.301
To explore the domain of loyalties, the article has illustrated
that, while battering is experienced as part of a complex system of
domination and control, the law may be structurally disabled from
hearing the truth of the relational dynamics of battering. Instead,
the law often decontextualizes “episodic physical violence from
the battering relationship.”302 Jurors may be deprived of
information necessary to form a coherent and reasonable story of
self-defense.303 Relationships on the interpersonal, as well as the
298

Cf. id. at 988 (noting “adjustments” that have taken place in the law
regarding domestic violence: “Yet law’s adjustments have, to this point, been
marginal: at times doctrinally incoherent; in places theoretically untenable; in
other places practically unworkable; always providing less than a remedy for the
true harm of domestic violence.”).
299
Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1275 (discussing the relationships
implicated in every criminal law defense— “the relationship between the
defendant and the victim and the relationship between the defendant and the
state.”).
300
Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 961 (exploring the “rupture” between
battering, as experienced by women, and the remedies offered by criminal law).
301
E.g., Mahoney, supra note 17 passim.
302
Tuerkheimer, supra note 131, at 985.
303
Id. (arguing that a jury cannot understand what motivates the
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community and state levels, often drive the fate of women who live
with battering men. Little accountability seems to be taken by
communities for failing to protect or provide resources for women
who live with battering men. Nor does the state answer for the
failings of the criminal justice system, including creating and
imposing legal doctrines that castigate and punish women for
rational choices made in battering relationships.304
In the normative domain, the article notes that the elements of
self-defense for women who kill battering men are all but
impossible to prove. Self-defense is structured by the
considerations of reasonableness, proportionality, retreat, and
imminence.305 Woven into the battered woman syndrome is the
trope of learned helplessness, undermining the “logic of selfdefense” by which a woman is judged by her capacity to react
rationally when in danger.306 Narrow interpretations of
proportionality interfere with jurors and judges being able to
apprehend the seriousness of the threat to a woman who lives with
a battering man. A look or gesture, in the context of the hostagetaking that aptly describes the battering relationship, may be as
dangerous as a loaded gun.307
Moreover, overt and covert retreat rules legitimize the
normative imperative that a woman prove inability to leave a
room, a residence, or a relationship in order to support a claim of
self-defense.308 Requiring retreat as a normative baseline robs
defendant’s actions without apprehending the system of subordination and
control that the law is masking).
304
Carol Bohmer et al., Domestic Violence Reforms: Reactions From the
Trenches, 29 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 71 (2002) (reporting on client reactions
to legal and policy reforms in the handling of domestic violence cases in the
criminal justice system as decidedly mixed. Clients, particularly, do not for the
most part see the criminal justice system as a solution to their problems).
305
Maguigan, supra note 18, at 385; see also DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING,
supra note 28, at 221 (noting the necessity, proportionality, and reasonablebelief components of self-defense).
306
Adams, supra note 221, at 224.
307
Fischer, supra note 134, at 2120 (describing seemingly innocent
gestures as “threatening symbols” in the context of a battering relationship).
308
Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1048-49 (Fla. 1999) (relaying
prosecutor’s argument that emphasized a failure to retreat).
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women of their first right to safety.309 The standard of imminence
functions as a retreat rule by borrowing prevailing social norms,
including the key unspoken norm that women leave battering
relationships.310 In this sense, imminence functions as a pre-retreat
rule, a standard that is not discursively tolerated in any
jurisdiction.311 States, such as Florida, that reject duties to retreat,
have effectively adopted a norm of retreat under the cloudy
concept of imminence.
Giving content to controlling legal norms are norms of relation
and property that disadvantage women.312 The retrofitted castle
doctrine may appear to be gender-neutral. However, an
examination of the interplay among facts, relationships, norms, and
meaning has illustrated that the legal doctrines by which women
who kill battering men are judged are not neutral standards, but are
infused with meaning about “fitting” relationships between men
and women.313 In other words, they are about power.314 Because
gender is part of a “stratification system” that gives unequal
statuses to men and women, the gender social norms that are
absorbed into the law are hostile to women.315
309

Wheatcroft, supra note 146, at 554 (arguing that a retreat rule
“inexcusably burdens battered persons by forcing them to attempt dangerous
escapes, to risk bodily harm at the hands of their batterers, or to face lengthy
prison terms for acting to protect their lives.”).
310
Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1280-82.
311
Id. at 1284-85.
312
Id. at 1287; see also Carpenter, supra note 3, at 685, 689 (exposing the
roles of property and sanctuary in the cohabitor exception to the castle doctrine).
313
Nourse, Relational, supra note 108, at 38-39 (observing that the rule of
imminence, due to the social norms it absorbs, replays a relation of inferiority of
women to men).
314
Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note §, at 1299 (proposing that the debate
over subjectivity in criminal law is really about “the politics of criminal law
scholarship.”).
315
Lorber, supra note 108, at 40 (describing the social institution of gender
as a process of creating social statuses, as a part of a stratification system that
ranks men and women, and as an organizing structure that divides work and
legitimates those in authority ); Nourse, Relational, supra note 108, at 38-39
(explaining that, while imminence is not motivated by hostility toward women,
the discrimination is one of relation that “reenacts a relation of inferiority and
invisibility.”).
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To examine the jurisprudential dimensions of the disconnect
between the law and the experience of battering, the article points
to the binarist structure of law and philosophy as creating positions
of subordination and privilege that support violence toward women
and that release abusive men from accountability. The subject /
object binary operates as a philosophical template that objectifies
women and, consequently, justifies the violence that is turned
toward women and other “others.”316 The public / private binary
attempts to sequester women in the private sphere, where private
property rights often trump personal safety.317
Ultimately, the article argues that, as a consequence of the
retreat and imminence doctrines, the safety of many women who
live with battering men is discounted. At the same time, greater
safety and legal protections for many men are bolstered by
measures such as the enhanced castle doctrine that reflects
prevailing norms of domination, privilege, mobility, and autonomy
in the public domain.318
In one episode of Gunsmoke, Miss Kitty shot a man who
abducted her and another woman.319 In the final scene, Kitty fell
into the arms of Marshall Matt Dillon, exclaiming, “I guess you
can do what you have to.”320 The present-day sequel to that
episode, imagined in this article, asks whether the lawman really
understood her claim of self-defense. Or will Miss Kitty find
herself an inmate of the Dodge City jail and have to struggle for
316

Kavanaugh, supra note 278, at 608; DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 275; see
also Audre Lorde, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in
SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 117 (1984) (advising that when white
women “ignore their built-in privilege of whiteness and define woman in terms
of their own experience alone, then women of Color become ‘‘other,’ the
outsider whose experience and tradition is too ‘‘alien’ to comprehend.”).
317
Carpenter, supra note 3, at 689 (noting disturbing issues where
possessory interests are elevated to trump personal rights of protection in the
sanctuary).
318
Cf. Nourse, Relational, supra note 108, at 38-39 (discussing the
absorption of social norms and relations of inferiority into the rule of
imminence).
319
Gunsmoke: Help Me Kitty (Nov. 7, 1964) (episode guide), at
http://www.tv.com/gunsmoke/help-me-kitty/episode/41248/summary.html.
320
Id.
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